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The Symbolic Subject in Information and Communications Technologies: Michel Freitag 




Grasping the novelty of contemporary technological mediation in its ubiquity, particularly within 
information and communications networks, typically involves recognizing the post-human status 
of subjects relationally embedded to technical processes that are increasingly autonomous 
relative to the individual. Problems with this approach become apparent once we consider both 
the symbolic character of human beings and the technical relation to objects as only a partial 
moment of a subject’s interaction with the world. Providing an answer to these concerns, Michel 
Freitag’s theory of the symbolic grants a sociological understanding of the role of technique 
within action in its historical unfolding as a distinctly productive activity in modernity. In this 
context, the predominance of theory over technique in the production of knowledge within 
modern scientific practice will slowly reverse as modern epistemology regresses into the abyss 
of the subject-object dualism of the enlightened individual while scientific production itself is 
progressively appropriated by industry as of the 19th century. This new operational 
understanding of scientific epistemology will reach its archetypical form in the post war field of 
cybernetics, where information ontology will quickly instigate further technical automation 
within productive labour and later influence neoliberal epistemologies in matters of governance. 
The latter, increasingly realized in the technocratic management of social life, will further 
effectuate itself in the digital infrastructure of contemporary communications systems under 
algorithmic governmentality in which both the normative and expressive ends of action tend to 
be subsumed. In this context, the reduction of language to its communication and of action to its 
operability will signal the ideological confusion between reality and its representation, together 
tending towards the unraveling of the transcendental unity of the subject and betraying the 





I wish to thank and express my recognition to Dr. Daniel Dagenais, whose expertise and 
infectious passion inspired me to pursue sociology and philosophy as a means towards 
knowledge. His wisdom, guidance, humility, and encouragement has granted me the invaluable 
gift of a better understanding of the world and our place within it.  
 I also extend all my love and appreciation for my parents, Martyne and Claude. I could 
have never reached the end without their unending support and unshakeable belief in me. Last 
but definitely not least, a shout out to the usual suspects James, Alex, Steve, Vince, Tim, and 
others whose collective authenticity and enthusiasm for life sustains me in laughing off the abyss 


































Table of Contents 
 
I. Input              p.1 
 
I.i The Relational Connected Post-human        p.4  
I.ii The Symbolic Subject of Reproductive Action       p.10  
I.iii Towards an Epistemology of Technique in Contemporary Sociality   p.15  
 
II.  Symbolic Subjectivity in the Historical Unfolding of Technique   p.18 
 
II.i The Dialectics of Subjectivity          p.18  
II.ii The Synthetic Unity of Transcendental Identity       p.21 
II.iii The Technical Moment of Action in Subjectivity and its  
Immediacy Within the Symbolic           p.24  
II.iv From the Artisan to the Engineer         p.28  
 
III. The Generalization of Technique in Practice       p.32 
 
III.i The Transcendental Individual and the Aporia of Science     p.32 
III.ii Paradigm Shifts and the Technicisation of Knowledge     p.35  
III.iii Information as Ontology          p.37 
III.iv New Technical Horizons of Social Organization      p.40 
 
IV. From Society to System          p.46 
 
IV.i Gears and Logic Gates: Laws and Operations        p.47 
IV.ii Big Data, Small Government          p.51 
 
V. Subjectivity Within the System         p.56 
 
V.i Reduction of Language to its Communicability       p.56 
V.ii Reduction of Action to its Operability        p.60 
V.iii Dissolution of Transcendental Identity         p.67 
 
VI. Output             p.75 
 




In January of 2019, The New York Times reported on an unusual event taking place in the city 
of Cremona, Italy. Five square blocks had been cordoned off in a city wide effort to reduce the 
noise radiating into the ground below the cobblestone streets. The reason? To isolate a specially 
designed auditorium where a small team of world class sound engineers were producing - with 
the help of equally competent musicians and the apex of modern recording technology - the 
“Stradivarius Sound Bank”; a database digitally storing all the notes and tones that can emanate 
from four of the “finest instruments ever crafted” in an effort to immortalize them1. The recorded 
samples will be manipulable with software to reproduce the sound of these instruments long after 
they have degraded.  
 There are many fascinating aspects about both the reality and the possibility of such a 
project. Of particular interest is the idea of preservation made possible with new recording 
techniques; the manner in which we conceive of ‘saving’ these invaluable instruments, these 
historical and cultural artefacts, through digital reproduction. On one hand, it demonstrates the 
immense capacity of modern computing and technology, as it is now possible to marshal the 
most current knowledge and practices of audio engineering and architectural precision (the 
Auditorium Averdi was designed with the instruments’ resonances in mind) and the most cutting 
edge audio recording tools (from microphone sensitivity to the preposterous sampling capacities 
of the latest analog to digital conversion) to replicate a sound beyond the technical capacity of 
the human ear to discern it from the original. Rooted in these practices and our use of this 
technology is the belief that the essential qualities of the Stradivarius will carry over into its 
digital reproduction and outlive its embodied manifestation. 
 The enthusiasm for technology underlining these beliefs and invigorating the imagination 
in such a manner within this specific domain of artistic practice is but one of many examples that 
signal both its increasing mediation in human expression but also its relative ubiquity. Case in 
point: The relatively recent proliferation of methods, mechanisms, and technologies falling under 
the larger umbrella of Big Data demonstrates how this undying faith in the emancipatory 
potential of technology is perceived at all levels of social life, from specific cultural practices to 
                                               
1 Paradiso, M. (2019, January 19). ‘To Save the Sound of a Stradivarius, a Whole City Must Keep Quiet’. The New 
York Times.  
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generalized beliefs regarding the structure of human society and its organization. Far from being 
simply limited to personalized marketing strategies, the increasing omnipresence of sensors, 
apparatus, and devices for the sake of collecting evermore information betrays the idea that we 
can increasingly regulate social life in a manner that better reflects individual tendencies as they 
are progressively freed from the biases of the aggregate representations of older political tools 
and concepts. Even criticism of this notion tends less towards skepticism of the underlying 
principle as much as falsifying the claim that technical systems are impartial and rather tend to 
reproduce existing inequalities and biases2. However, as Mark Andrejevic argues, the more the 
neutrality of the machine is called into question, “the more we invoke the imperative to attempt 
to clean the data, make it accurate, and turn the development of automated systems over to the 
machines themselves3.“ Above and beyond reifying a generalized pop science credo that the 
more information one acquires the greater their capacity to predict future events, we once again 
come across a new set of operations legitimated on the aspiration that technical progress can 
model or virtually crystallize the ephemeral qualities of the human spirit and render them 
commensurable in digital form. How can we sociologically make sense of the history and 
possibility of such a worldview? What kind of epistemologies does its existence and its analysis 
entail? At stake are the ramifications of new technological innovations on the forms and qualities 
of social life. But what about its nature? Is it simply that new technical affordances bring about 
equally new structural challenges or are these devices and systems collectively implicated in 
more profound changes in the constitution of sociality and deeper still, the very basis of 
subjectivity? 
 In effect, any half decent attempt to sociologically operationalize the general object that is 
technology will quickly reveal its nebulous outline. Technology is a word whose greek root 
technikon is that which belongs to technē, which loosely translates into “art”, or “craft”; the skill 
and activity of the artisan in his or her exercise4. Technology is therefore the extension of 
specific practices towards particular ends. The mobile phone extends the reach of the voice; the 
abacus and the calculator extend the capacity of the mind in mathematical calculation; the pulley 
enhances the strength of the lifter; the spear extends the reach and enhances the penetrating force 
                                               
2 Almost as if these machines were the products of divine intervention and not human practice… 
3 Andrejevic, M. (2019) ‘Automating Surveillance’. Surveillance & Society 17(1/2): p.12. 
4 Heidegger, M. (1977) ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in The Question Concerning Technology and other 
Essays. New York: Harper & Row; p.5. 
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of the hunter. In these various instances, the efficiency of an activity is heightened through 
objects produced for that very purpose and whose qualities, in both function and design, 
generally reflect the context in which these activities are situated. But is the lion’s teeth or the 
eagle’s claws not efficiently arranged towards the slaying and devouring of its prey? Is the 
human brain not more efficiently constructed to process complex problems? Indeed, the above 
etymology and the categorization implied in the attempt to outline technology as an object 
connotes the all important fact that technological objects cannot be severed from the practices or 
from the techniques that constitute them. Stated in Heideggerian terms, technology is thus a 
manifestation of technique, and technique itself is inseparable from the essence of being insofar 
as it is a part of human activity. So while it’s instrumental definition as a “tool” is correct and at 
first perfectly acceptable, in that it conforms to our use of these devices as means to achieve the 
ends they were designed for, “means”, “ends”, and their “correct” application imply a normative 
dimension within the intended activity that is historically determined, and as such it has 
ontological significance, if not determinacy, for society (the world), social interaction and its 
possibility (action), and subjects themselves (consciousness).  
 This fact, above and beyond merely echoing basic sociological intuition, suggests the 
necessary ground for examining the object of technology and its effects on human activity must 
be considered from a dialectical understanding that the distinction between subject and object is 
intertwined in its historical determination with the modes of technological effervescence, 
regardless of the manner in which it subsumes our lived experience. This demands that we 
recognize the mode in which the subject is dialectically enacted against a world of objects, and 
thus how the metaphysical reality of Being is in itself historically determined. In other words, we 
can already infer that any inquiry into the nature of an object as a site of sociological study - in 
our case technology - is at once an inquiry about the status (or the form) of the subject both 
ontologically as subject and epistemologically as a formal category of sociological theory in 
contemporary society and intellectual thought respectively. It is thus in that formal subject and 
object separation that a certain sociological truth about technology in our modern age lies hidden 
and that, within the context of this discussion, technology shall not be an “object” in the sense of 
being exterior to the subject - substantially, metaphysically, and formally. We are attempting to 
abandon the neutral, merely instrumental status of the object of technology as res extensa. The 
human being’s relationship to technology in the 21st century is above all an ontological issue, as 
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such its problematization must begin with similar considerations with regards to subjectivity.  
 It is in this manner that we shall therefore speak of “technique” as a specific and thus 
necessarily partial dimension of human action from which the objects of technology as human 
productions emanate5. But this operationalization of the concept is neither obvious nor without 
contention. Various theories on the historical particularity of technique have already been 
developed in an effort to encapsulate its elusive object and its contemporary effect on human 
civilization6. Others have focussed on the specificity of our contemporary relation to technique, 
either directly or indirectly through theorization addressing the “post”-human status of the 
individual subject. In a world that cannot be accurately apprehended in the common sense, 
categorical, or even metaphysical delineations between nature and artifice, the subject is 
conceived through its both figurative and literal appendages, the analysis of which generally 
avows poststructuralist ontologies (especially those of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari7) and 
thus is often accompanied by critique questioning the status (or relevance…) of certain 
privileged sociological categories, most notably identity as the apparent totem of the modern 
liberal subject.  
 
 
I.i The Relational Essence of the Connected Post-human 
  
 One strategy that is employed in better grasping subjectivity within technology is the 
establishing of a relational ontology of the subject in order to epistemologically attribute the 
proper value to technique in contemporary social life. The work of Katherine Hayles provides an 
excellent example, as she is considered one of the key thinkers on the mediation of digital 
                                               
5 This usage of the word speaks to the many French language sources used in this work. While “La Technique” is 
usually translated as Technics, the singular Technique rings truer to both its operationalization in this work and the 
forthcoming description of Michel Freitag’s theory of the symbolic. 
6 Ellul J. (1980) The Technological System (Translation of Le système technicien). New York: The Conrinuum 
Publishing Company; Heidegger, op. cit; Gehlen, A. (1980) Man in the Age of Technology. New York: Columbia 
University Press; and of course, the works of Bernard Stiegler, most notably the Technics and Time trilogy.  
7 The other problem with the ontology of the subject in Deleuze stems from the possibility of the critique being 
itself contained with the system in its contemporary specificity. In a text titled “Postscripts on Societies of Control”, 
Deleuze himself recognizes that within the context of societies formerly based on disciplined and now moving 
towards control, “Individuals have become “dividuals,” and masses, samples, data, markets, or “banks””. In other 
words, premising a study of technological mediation from the ontology of an already technically-mediated subject 
occludes the possibility of an effective critique. See Deleuze, G. (1992) ‘Postscript for the Societies of Control’. 
October, Vol. 59; pp. 3-7. 
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systems and technologies in this field, having pushed hard throughout her research to reframe the 
manner in which we consider these technical systems as mere objects in our environments. To be 
sure, Hayles is not making an argument for the consciousness of electronic devices, or even 
larger intelligent systems at the infrastructural level of a contemporary information society. 
However, she is generally attempting to make sense of the growing and perennially changing 
economy between beings and machines. Distinguishing between cognition and consciousness in 
an effort to extend meaning-making capacities to intelligent machines and other complex 
technical systems, she defines the former as “a process that interprets information within 
contexts that connect it with meaning”8. This definition is dependent on the operationalization of 
a golden rule of cybernetics epistemologies extending from Claude Shannon’s theory of 
information - that information has no necessary connection to meaning, but is rather conceived in 
terms of a probability of message elements9. So rather than conceive of a semantic relation 
between the signifier and the signified, information is here tied to a probabilistic selection within 
sets (eg an alphabet, or on another level a lexicon), which is why it is essentially divorced from 
meaning. However, Hayles notes how the inherent constraints of the set (divergences within 
probabilistic selection) and the context of its enactment are necessarily tied to meaning as well. 
Since “the meaning of information is given by the processes that interpret it” and that processes 
always occur in context, then the literary theorist’s definition can be seen as applying to a 
multitude of situations and circumstances, from “utterances of natural language between 
humans” to “the communications between layers of code in computational media”10. This 
highlights the emphasis on embodiment so crucial to Hayles in establishing information’s 
context. The processes interpreting meaning are here necessarily the functions (organic or 
otherwise) enacted through stimuli. Meaning is therefore contingent upon the subject form in its 
constitution, in line with Maturana and Varela’s operationalization of cognition not as “the 
representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but […] rather the enactment of a world 
                                               
8 Hayles, K. (2017) Unthought: the power of the cognitive nonconscious. London : The University of Chicago Press, 
p.22. 
9 Hayles, K. (1999) How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press; p.52. The basis for this consideration was not strictly epistemological, but 
methodological; we shall return to this later on. 
10 Unthought, p.25. Cognition is therefore not an attribute, but a process. 
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and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world 
performs”11.  
 To be clear, Hayles rejects the epistemologies of living subjects as mere biological 
instantiations of informational patterns, but also dismisses the enlightened individual liberal 
subject of Reason endowed with free will, essentially and more specifically conceptualized as 
free will from others12. This nourishes her endeavour of envisioning better ways to understand 
the economy between humans and machines, insisting on the fact that computation (code) and 
“legacy systems” (language) always exist in relation to each other. As such, there are “more 
benign” ways to conceptualize the post-human 
 
“…that can serve as effective counterbalances to the liberal humanist subject, 
transforming untrammelled free will into a recognition that agency is always relational 
and distributed, and correcting an over-emphasis on consciousness to a more accurate 
view of cognition as embodied throughout human flesh and extended into the social and 
technological environment13.” 
 
Code and Language are therefore entangled in this web of complexity, where one refers to the 
other through the extension of processes into the world. But this bridge is also redoubled at an 
ideological level, where Hayles argues fervently against what she calls “the regime of 
computation”; characterized by a feedback loop between the proliferation of better and 
increasingly pervasive computer technologies and the belief “that physical reality is 
computational in nature”14. Like in the concept of the post-human, Hayles sees in the idea that 
reality is inherently computational (informational) insidious aspects that must absolutely be 
resisted, but also an opportunity to break down “traditional concepts”, old political and 
epistemological barriers. The global interconnection of “cognitive systems in which humans are 
increasingly embedded” which not only includes the internet but also “networked and 
programmable systems that feed into it, including wired and wireless data flows across the 
                                               
11 Unthought, p.21. 
12 How We Became Posthuman, p.3. 
13 Hayles, K. (2006) ‘Unfinished Work: From cyborg to cognisphere’ in Theory, Culture & Society Work; p.160.  
14 Hayles, K. (2005) My Mother Was a Computer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; p.219. Engineering 
historian Otto Mayr made similar points about the metaphor of the clock and the ideologies of order legitimating 
state operations. See Mayr, O. (1986) Authority, liberty, & automatic machinery in early modern Europe. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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electromagnetic spectrum” emphasizes the new ecology in which “humans are not the only 
actors” called the cognisphere, succeeding Donna Haraway’s figure of the cyborg as the new 
vision of the human-machine interlace15. Sociologically, we can readily see this as a doubling of 
the change from human to post-human at the level of social organization in its larger unity. 
 Hayles denial of both technological determinism and liberal humanism hence opens up the 
path for this “middle way” to think about the human-machine assemblage where the subject 
acquires a status that exceeds its embodied self-containment, epistemologically forcing the 
recognition of the relational subject - that is to say, the ontological center of subjectivity is 
displaced from the mind to the relation itself - and opening an avenue for contemplating the 
manner in which this relation alters the long privileged status of the autonomous human being 
whose consciousness represents the center of action and identity. Meaning is transposed through 
the various systems that produce it in their specificity, which is only possible for Hayles to the 
extent that her definition of cognition extends beyond the mind (and the body’s) enclosure and 
can be conceived as part of the machine-human ecology she illustrates. In this lies the “distinct 
advantage” and particularity of computational media: the cognitive abilities of these technologies 
impart it with an evolutionary potential that is stronger than any other technological form of the 
past, and it is for this reason that they hold “special relationships with the quintessentially 
cognitive species, Homo sapiens16”. That contemporary technologies manifest a shift in human 
cognition is the premise on which Hayles grounds evidence for a relational and distributed 
ontology of subjectivity. In his analysis of Hayles’ thought, David Cecchetto exemplifies this 
fact by comparing divergent uses of memory in digital devices from more “analog” techniques: 
 
“On one hand, written information is appended to a conscious thought as an 
enhancement device […] By contrast, computationally distributed information is 
conjoined with conscious thought as a nonconscious memory that animates itself through 
its relations to other cognitive processes rather than predominantly through conscious 
commands. That is, as contemporary technologies combine and recombine to produce 
increasingly large and complex networks, it becomes less and less possible to 
                                               
15 Unfinished Work; p.159, 161: “Although Haraway associated it with the ‘informatics of domination’, the 
cyborg’s shock value came mostly from the implication that the human body would be modified with cyber-
mechanical devices. Although research on implants continues, contemporary formations are at once more subtle and 
more far-reaching than the figure of the cyborg allows”. 
16 Unthought; p.33-4. 
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convincingly promulgate a worldview that would posit a single human actor at the center 
of these activities17.” 
 
From this understanding of integration and influence on human action, the autonomy of the 
subject tends to be undermined through its necessary relation to increasingly autonomous 
machines. Therefore a complete understanding of the relation between the two essentially 
becomes akin to translating thoughts across disparate systems within a network. The implied 
“special relationships“ are characterized by the increasing autonomy of these technical systems 
with regards to their ability to “interpret information” and “make decisions” based on 
information received. Within this increasing autonomy, there is an acknowledgement that the 
meaning deriving from code is specific to its condition as directly dependent on its materiality; 
that is it say, code is completely unintelligible from one physical context to another18. Hayles 
therefore recognizes essential differences in operations, yet resists formulations that “reify 
borders and create airtight categories” when it comes to technical cognitive systems because the 
influence is essentially mutual19. While systems are imparted with the human actions which 
created them (and the intentions that went behind them i.e global capital), they in turn alter 
human action and reconfigure the meaning from which they derive their legitimacy. In other 
words, the relation itself is irreducible to its points of connection. 
 While this description of being-machine ecologies is structurally remarkable, it nonetheless 
exposes some important phenomenological ambiguities, beginning with the quality of meaning 
implicit in Hayles’ analysis. Since the boundedness of code to its materiality in establishing 
context is necessarily taken from the position of embodied consciousness given that context 
constitutes space and time, the tie of information to meaning in technical cognition still emanates 
from human perception. Technical systems exercise complex tasks in an increasingly 
autonomous fashion, but meaning is irrelevant as the concept (of meaning, but also the concept 
itself as an “object” of thought and therefore consciousness) necessarily rests on the recognition 
of an act; it does not constitute an a priori for the operations of code in the strict sense. 
Recognition implies consciousness, the uniqueness of which Hayles still grants to biological 
organisms, but that only speaks to the possibility of meaning, and doesn’t reveal anything with 
                                               
17 Cecchetto, D. (2013) Humanesis. Minneapolis. University of Minnesota press; p.76-7. 
18 My Mother Was a Computer, p.47-49. 
19 Unthought, p.31. 
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regards to its essence. Approaching this from the inverse direction, that the specificity of code 
contrasts with natural languages that survive or transcend their physical instantiation (in speech, 
writing, narrative, etc.) implies not just the latter’s existence, but its essence as being found 
within a domain of reality that remains inaccessible to code. Both recognition and the 
transcendance of the object condition point to this essence as symbolic20. In other words, while 
Hayles’ post human subject rightfully extends to contemporary technical systems their important 
and particular status, this is accomplished by at once relinquishing consciousness (la 
conscience21) as the cynosure of meaning, and yet operating on a disavowed notion of meaning 
that nonetheless emanates from a distinctly human existence. The ontological question of 
meaning itself and what characterizes the specificity of social life is left unattended simply on 
the grounds that what has been ignored with the classic liberal individual is the relational nature 
of sociality as such; subjectivity remains in flux.   
 Hayles’ rejection of the individual unified subject is premised on the fact that it directly 
emanates from the cartesian cogito and the possessive individualism that resulted from making 
consciousness “the seat of identity”; drawing a line of continuity between the disembodying 
tendencies of the liberal subjective mind and those of the informational posthuman of 
cybernetics22. This is consistent with the theorist positing that meaning is contingent upon the 
subject’s constitution, but in this relation the world itself is always disclosed to an organism 
according to the manner of its constitution. Phenomenologically, this means that the disclosure 
of the world in subjectivity is not reducible to mere sense experience, particularly in the case of 
human beings who interact with the world in a symbolic capacity, and this is where the 
contradiction emerges. Hayles correctly posits the weight of humanity’s relation to new 
technologies, and alludes to the influence of the object in the subject’s constitution, but does so 
while disavowing the necessary premise of the symbolic constitution of human subjectivity. The 
recusal of the Cartesian view of extension into the world through technique (res extensa) in 
assigning a relative autonomy to technical systems with regards to meaning is answered by the 
dissolution of the dialectics of subjectivity which characterize the possibility of sociality and its 
symbolic contingencies. 
                                               
20 This does not discount the possibility of communicability, mediation, or mutual influence, but rather speaks to an 
essential incommensurability between the two realms; essential to its nature but also to our understanding.  
21 The french word carries a dual emphasis on “consciousness” and “conscience” which should be emphasized here.  
22 How We Became Posthuman, p.4, 149. 
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 Furthermore, granting the mutual influence (co-evolution) of human beings and complex 
machines, the relation does not simply alter the conditions of meaning-production, but of its 
quality as well. Framed another way, admitting the symbolic nature of meaning in its 
(re)production entails questions on how the nature and function of the symbolic itself is altered 
within the “cognisphere”. We’ve already shown above how the human being’s increasing 
dependency on technical systems also entails that action into the world is increasingly realized 
through these technical appendages. This means that technique constitutes an ever-growing part 
of the subject’s necessary relation to a world. But as alluded to above, technique and its 
manifested objects have always been part of human practice in its interplay with other 
dimensions of symbolic existence. To speak of the manner in which different technological 
modes have informed human practice is one thing, but to ground the workings of subjectivity in 
its mere relation to these objects is to make of technique its own force that is ontologically 
divorced from human practice in its symbolic significance where history itself becomes the 
sequence of events unfolding from impersonal relations to autonomous technical objects23.  
 
 
I.ii The Symbolic Subject of (Re)productive Action 
 
 These considerations - the disavowal of the symbolic character of subjectivity and the all 
encompassing singular nature of the technical relation to a world - combined with the earlier 
stated ontological concerns with technology as an object of technique, suggest that a relational 
view towards the subject risks occluding important aspects of a properly social analysis of the 
                                               
23 As an example, Arnold Gehlen developed a similar account of the technical unfolding of history. As human 
beings increase their technological capacity, technique takes on different roles starting as organ enhancement (the 
hammer makes it easier to hit the nail than the hand) and substitution (industrial machinery substituting the 
labouring capacities of the body), and finally liberation, where the ultimate aim of all technological capacity is to 
emancipate ourselves from the necessities of our biological functions altogether (the technological appropriation of 
our symbolic psychological functions ensuing from mechanical enhancement). Similarly to Hayles, his observations 
were relevant in the way in which they reveal the importance of technological development as so much more than a 
neutral force whose power over the psyche rests solely on its instrumental capacity to enable, amplify, and 
reproduce an imposed ideological application that is attached to it from the outside. From this perspective we can 
see that the blindness of the view towards technology in its generality as res extensa, as the subject’s instrumental 
empowerment over the world and nature, is double: it not only ignores the relinquishing of the conditions under 
which action is grounded in a world and thus an equal diminishing of the possibility of finding or creating meaning 
in action, but also rejects the more general fact of its dialectical relationship to the existential condition of human 
beings beyond its objectification as the “extended thing”. See Gehlen, A. (1980). Op cit.  
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effects of technical systems. In light of this, sociologically grasping the newness of 
contemporary technique in the technological mediation of social life involves a dialectical 
approach emphasizing the necessity to reflect on any object beyond the split between structure 
(macro) and practice (micro) in a manner which harmonizes these ends into a way of thinking 
about the reproduction of society through action and the possible meaning it bears. Michel 
Freitag’s theories on the symbolic seems more than adequate for this task. 
 Freitag’s conception of action is that of a synthetic apprehension of being-in-the-world, 
where there is a normative, expressive, and cognitive dimension to all action together coinciding 
in the generating of sense and meaning24. With regards to the subject in relation to an object, the 
mediations that we understand as “social” are themselves in a sense “objective”, not strictly in 
the Durkheimian sense (“as if they were things”) in that they have an empirical character within 
the dialectic through which symbolic subjectivity is phenomenologically effective, but rather in 
the manner in which both the forces of normative regulation and spaces of free expression in 
everyday life together constitute a definitive capacity for practice. 
 
“[L]e cours ordinaire de la vie sociale - et les sciences sociales ne s'y soustraient que 
dans un effort de réflexion critique - est dominé par l'exigence fonctionnelle d'une 
réification des sujets et des objets de la pratique, qui se manifeste précisément dans la 
fixation conceptuelle ou catégorique des termes signifiants, ainsi que par la "mise en 
transparence" corrélative des médiations symboliques, dont l'épaisseur ou le poids 
ontologique, la "signifiance" structurée et structurante propre se trouve justement 
projetée sur les objets référentiels de tout rapport significatif. Ainsi le sujet, dès qu'il 
s'appréhende réflexivement c'est-à-dire symboliquement, s'apparaît-il toujours d'abord à 
lui-même comme une personne ou un individu existant en lui-même et pour lui-
même…25.” 
                                               
24 It is important to note that the separation of these categories within action is merely formal, an effect of the fact 
that we are engaging with this object in a systematic manner within the confines of a scientific discipline, in order to 
parse out the effects of its otherwise immaterial fluctuations over time (since societies change over the course of 
history). In so far as we basically understand action as the interaction of a subject with objects, this separation is 
nothing really new, since in a way the scientist has perennially defined itself within the removal of the normative 
and expressive dimension as it concerns the object being studied. See Freitag, M. (2011) Dialectique et Société 
Vol.2: Introduction à une théorie générale du symbolique. Montréal: Liber; p.367-8. 
25 Freitag, M. (1995) ‘Pour un dépassement de l'opposition entre "holisme" et "individualisme" en sociologie”’ in 
Jean-François Côté (dir.) Individualismes et Individualité, Montréal: Les Éditions Septentrion; p.274; The subject in 
Freitag’s dialectic is not closed in on itself; it is unified. Epistemologically, it does not claim intelligence or 
awareness of environment in the name of the human species. However, it does claim the necessary attachment of all 
life to the conditions of its origins as the positive delineation of its operational freedom, not merely as limiting, but 
as binding in the co-definition of the subject and the object in the formal dialectics of subjectivity. Furthermore, we 
can now argue that to premise recognition and understanding purely on the basis of inter-individual relations 
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In congruent fashion, it is the world itself in its immanence, in its “being-there” (Heidegger) 
which phenomenologically appears to bear meaning, doubled up through the fact that the Other 
(both in the sense of a collective and in the sense of individual difference) appears to be oriented 
in a like manner. Human action is thrown upon the world within the symbolic through the 
signification of language (and it is always a specific language in practice, as opposed to a generic 
category or form) which in turn orients human action symbolically26. 
 For our purposes, technique is the consonance of the subject’s operations with an empirical 
‘objective’ world, where action is intentionally oriented towards an efficient adjustment of the 
subject’s milieu according the relation it harbours with it; a relation which is already contingent 
upon a valuation of the milieu that is always-already both expressive and normative. Therefore, 
technique represents only a partial moment of subjectivity and is necessarily tied to the other 
dimensions of action within this symbolic apprehension of reality. Thus, the formal coherence of 
this metaphysic problematizes the subject/object dualism in a way that separates this analysis 
from its contemporaries: There is no technological barrier separating the subject from his or her 
“natural” or organic condition, nor are we situating the subject outside the nexus of 
consciousness in establishing a relational understanding of “the social” to endow other objects - 
like technical systems - with their proper signification27. Every intentional action carries a 
                                               
(similar to how in cybernetics the manifestation of an object essentially speaks less to its presence but its probability 
of being actualized against other potentialities) implies that whatever is social itself arises merely out of these 
relations, but cannot have any effective existence of its own. Another way of saying this is that there are only 
individuals, and the symbolic is here merely the fact of virtuality establishing the behavioural conditions under 
which these individuals co-exist, and norms are essentially reduced to being mere rules of the game, as such 
themselves reducing the subject’s field of possibility. In this instance, the symbolic either doesn’t exist given its lack 
of empirical objectivity, or figuratively transcends this level of reality but is necessarily an oppressive psychological 
force through which balance for all partaking individuals must be met. 
 Furthermore, It should be clear from this conception of the subject that Freitag is likewise presenting a 
critique of the liberal cartesian subject, albeit one that avows the nature of the production of meaning in significant 
action predicated on the synthetic unity of subjectivity. The critique of the modern subject thus presented is 
correspondent to Hayle’s in so far as she recognizes the larger problems in reducing the brain to its conscious 
capacity, but the solution is quite different and, in our eyes, more in touch with the ontology of Being. 
26 Holisme, p.26; This also carries important implications for the very possibility of operationalizing language as a 
universal set independent of its socio-cultural contexts, further condemning Hayles’ attempt to reconcile meaning 
with the “language of the machine”. Expressed differently, if context is in the differential parameters of the set and 
its use, its universal quality nonetheless betrays its inherent absence of world upon which any normativity, and 
therefore statement of value, can emanate and furthermore be fostered.   
27 Object-oriented ontologies, as found in the works of researchers like Bruno Latour and Jane Bennett represent the 
extreme end of this approach, where objects themselves are endowed with a certain methodological agency as 
producers of meaning within “the social”. In effect, the former’s actor network theory goes as far as rejecting any 
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technical dimension, but is not subsumed by it. Our concern is thus with the manner in which 
symbolic existence, in its socio-phenomenological significance, is transformed under the current 
relation to technique. It is the state of social reality itself - human worldliness - that is under 
consideration here28. With this in mind and with regards to the scope of this analysis, it is the 
rupture with this metaphysic that is of interest; the manner in which new technologies are 
manifest of a particular relation to technique that breaks with the historical unfolding of the 
subject in the symbolic29. As such the approach - reciprocal with Freitag's analysis of the 
historical unfolding of the specificity of technique that until its formal appearance in late 
modernity is negative and formally anachronistic - is necessarily comparative (and negative) 
given the argument made here that a particular view towards subjectivity and action, one which 
is avowedly symbolic, is necessary in sociologically grasping the specificity and character of 
modern technological captivation. 
 The above dialectic and epistemological considerations signal implications for the 
methodological: From the perspective of interpreting social phenomena, the social sciences are 
bound, in their pretension of an objective narrative construction of that which is meaningful from 
the position of actors within it, to hermeneutic interpretation. For if we submit the premise that 
action is meaningful beyond itself through the interpretation of what it reproduces, and that the 
terms of this reproduction, while nonetheless real, can only be formally broken down given the 
symbolic character of human activity, it follows from this that the evolution of action over time 
and space, historical change, necessarily takes on a typological form; ideal-typical in its general 
pretension of illustrating the essence of a mode of symbolic sociality, but real in its claim to 
access with regards to the essence of this (re)production and transformation in the overcoming of 
its tensions and contradictions.       
                                               
specificity to the social altogether through an inductive approach that attempts to relinquish any predefined 
framework or theory in order to grant actors the possibility of their full expressive capacity, because the social is 
what essentially gets in the way of sociality. 
28 In this also lies the possibility of this analysis to be considered coherent within the confines of the object being 
analyzed, which is to say that - like capitalism - technological paradigms can only be understood from within the 
world they produce.  
29 To be clear, this does not imply a “conservative” approach to contemporary technological effervescence; the 
purpose of this analysis is not in valuing a return to “the good old days” but rather on one hand to evince the essence 
of our relationship to technique in its “newness” and on the other make a case for the fact that this must be 
approached through an avowal of the symbolic nature of the subject.  
 14 
 Freitag’s typology of the different forms of social reproduction generally follows a pattern 
of increasing differentiation, not just within the formal dimensions of action, but in the 
differential practices that evidence their increasing autonomy in history within their movement 
from one mode of social reproduction to another. The most unified and undifferentiated form of 
social regulation and reproduction is that manifest within societies known as cultural-symbolic. 
In these, meaning is directly immanent to the intervention of subjects within the world (as 
opposed to a particular world or to nature, the latter implying a level of differentiation that 
remains to be actualized) so that different activities - at once expressive, cognitive, and 
normative - are all gathered and regulated under a common and particular kind of being-in-the-
world. However, this has not always been the case, and as societies became more differentiated 
and more complex, activities like those of “labour” and “work” acquired particular qualities with 
regards to their function or status within the organization of society. These areas of social life 
were differentiated from the larger normative existence of sociality as such. However, this is not 
to say that they were severed from these other relations, they were very much tied to them and 
integral to these societies' mode of reproduction. In this context, technique acquired a certain 
autonomy from the other dimensions of action, in so far as it had a quality as a specific capacity 
towards action, but was unified in the sublimation of its end within a reference that transcended 
it30.  
 It is precisely this necessary attachment as transcendental reference to a collective both as 
an ideal (progress towards individual freedom) and as object (society in its concrete totality, in 
its unity) that tends to be dissolved in the “postmodern” societal mode where institutions 
increasingly assume the form of organizations and the transcendent ends of the former mutate 
into decision-based operations networks. The key here is to recognize the symbolic significance 
of a shift from the legitimacy of power contained in its ideals to the operational exercise of 
control over the environment as regulatory mechanisms. This is not, in the strictest sense, 
contemporary, since we will see how this kind of rationalizing of practice in industry has been at 
                                               
30 From the ideal-typical basis of comparison being established here, the various subjectivities depicted in the 
knowledge and practices - philosophical, theological, or scientific - throughout the historical unfolding of human 
social organization can all be encapsulated under this formal dialectic of the coming-to-being of subjectivity, since it 
is from this basic understanding of the very possibility of the symbolic that the categories of social reproduction in 
Freitag come about, in so far as his dialectics are of a phenomenological account of the possibility of the evolution 
of sociality in subjective existence formally understood and analyzed in the synthesis of their different specificities 
(the analysis is thus necessarily retrospective, since the different moments of action in their autonomy are avowedly 
modern in their conceptualization).  
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work for quite some time under the broad umbrella of capitalism. Of particular interest to us is 
the manner in which this rational-organizational regulation has itself increasingly retreated into 
the shadows of a technological intervention itself re-affirming the classic hedonistically driven 
promise of progress; so much so that the basic kernel of social interaction is increasingly bound 
by its physical (and metaphysical) lines as the reach of technological mediation into social 
activity becomes ubiquitous. How does this enlighten the reader on the approach taken in this 
work? The major "site" remains a sociological understanding of the phenomenal subject in its co-
constitution with(in) a world. Of particular interest are the dynamics of technique as part of, and 
manifest of, historically recent changes in the manner of its synthesis. But the conditions of 
possibility for these changes, and the ideological legitimacy which permits it, is charged with a 
history of knowledge and practices that are vital to enlighten both the character of human being's 
relationship to technology but to the possibility of a critical epistemology of technique in our 
present age, and what it means for the researcher and the sociologist more specifically.      
 
 
I.iii Towards an Epistemology of Subjectivity in Technically Mediated Sociality 
 
 In pursuing this path, this work will deploy itself in the following manner: We will first 
examine how Freitagian subjectivity formally emerges in the relation between the expressiveness 
of being in its relative operational freedom and the normative appropriation of a world that is 
freely assumed in its contingency. The moment of synthesis is manifest in being as an identity 
established in space and time through which one can make sense of a world. Within this basic 
frame, technique can only be conceived anachronistically since the instrumentality of action is 
yet to be differentiated from the intention of an act that is always already imprinted within the 
symbolic. Technique as a distinct moment within human action has its genesis in the 
differentiation of a specifically productive activity and will only realize itself through its 
universalization within different practices institutionalized and unified in their recognition at the 
level of the collective as distinct occasions of a now individualized transcendence.  
 In this context, we will see how the classical sciences were scaffolded on modern 
epistemology, securing the transcendental ideal of truth. But in the face of a growing aporia in 
the epistemological dualism of a subject (scientist) sovereign with regards to the object (nature), 
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science will progressively lose its transcendental reference in favour of its operational capacity, 
the ends of theory will tend to be sublimated into those of technique, reducing the cognitive end 
of symbolic signification characterizing science to the same ontological level as its practice. 
Within the context of the appropriation of scientific practice and knowledge by industry through 
the latter half of the 19th and opening decades of the 20th century, the ends of technique will be 
rendered on the production line through social engineering practices and technological 
automation. Furthermore, in a society increasingly rationalized into decision-making 
organizational structures, the credo of operational efficiency will generalize itself into the 
technocratic management of social life within which the unity of society will tend to dissolve 
into its conceptualization as a system. Under these circumstances, aided by neoliberal ideas 
echoing cybernetic concepts in political economics, technocratic practices will fully realize 
themselves in the digital infrastructures of information society and inaugurate a new form of 
governance. In algorithmic governmentality, mounds of data are collected, analyzed, and 
processed with the aim of automating the regulation of social life through predictive algorithms 
that fragment (individualize) collective behaviour.   
 Having established the nature of the symbolic and the historical specificity of technique, 
we will finally see that existentially, in the above context, the meaning of action within the 
subject will tend to fall back on its function in the ideological devaluation of language to its 
communicability and the parallel reduction of action to its operability. The manner in which the 
distinction between specific practices and a unifying praxis in political modernity will diminish 
in a society of organizational decisions and practices is echoed in the expressive moment of 
action through the sublimation of its transcendental reference into its immediate realizable end. 
In other words, the realization of an autonomous technique free from an end that transcends its 
execution realizes the effective end of action rather than its disclosure in an ongoing infinite 
process as practice. Finally, within these processes - encapsulated under the confusion between 
reality and its representation - the various modes of alterity which characterize the subject’s 
necessary ontological condition of identitary synthesis will tend to collapse as the references of 
actions and the meaning derived from them are subsumed in the arbitrariness of a will oriented 
towards desires insinuating the disavowed fantasy of an absolute operational freedom.  
 It was Freitag that said of the technocratic influence on thought itself, “it is no longer the 
nature of things that interest us, but only their transformations and the control we can ensure over 
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them”31 and it is this fact above many others that inspired this inquiry. The object of technology, 
particularly within the context of a society increasingly formalized into technical systems, does 
more than merely change the material conditions of our existence, but also fundamentally alters 
the conditions of our symbolic nature and the parameters under which we are engaged in the 
proliferation of meaning through thought, expression, and the praxis which ensues. Ironically, 
our attempts to epistemically reconfigure the categories of “life”, “awareness”, and 
“intelligence” to better fit the proliferation of ambivalence and fluid boundaries signified by 
algorithms and machine learning as mechanisms of automation32 seem to reflect a deeper truth 
about the vectors of human adaptation to these technical objects. In simpler terms, as machines 
become more human, humans seem to become more like machines. This project is an endeavour 
in sociologically grappling with how this is so through the frame of the symbolic subject in 
















                                               
31  Freitag, M. (2006) ‘La nature de la technique’ in L’oubli de la société. Pour une théorie critique de la 
postmodernité. Québec: Prèsse de l’Université de Laval; p.385. Original text: “Ce n’est plus la nature des choses qui 
nous intéresse, mais seulement leurs transformations et le contrôle que nous pouvons nous en assurer.” In a 
connected footnote, he adds; “De là à penser que la nature des choses suit elle-même un cours probabiliste!”. 
32 Not to mention genetic engineering… 
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II. SYMBOLIC SUBJECTIVITY IN THE HISTORICAL UNFOLDING OF  
TECHNIQUE  
 
II.i The dialectics of subjectivity 
 
 For Freitag, the symbolic is at once already constituted by and constitutive of the 
phenomenon, the existential space, of subjectivity. Conceived as a dimension of human reality, it 
is just as ‘real’ as the empirical world, but of a different essence all the while emerging from it - 
a reality coming into itself from within the entire historical development of the necessary 
ontological distance created between subject and object in the process of subjectification, of the 
coming-into-being of subjectivity proper. After all, while human beings can be qualified in the 
specificity of their activity, they still carry the vestiges of their ancestor’s all the way back to the 
primordial goop from which life on earth emerged, and it is only within this long extensive 
process that both the specificity of the symbolic as immanent to the being of humanity and the 
latter’s ties to all life on earth can be reconciled. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to begin by 
unpacking the metaphysic at work in the co-establishment of the two poles in the coming-to-
being of any subject: On one hand, you have the objective determination of an empirical 
environment. On the other, the relative autonomy (‘liberté opératoire’) enacted within the 
indeterminacy of subjective orientation. These ends dialectically constitute themselves in their 
relation, and it is within the elevation of their synthesis at a ‘higher level’ of being and of 
differentiation that we will be able to make sense of the symbolic.   
 It must be stressed that this formal genesis of being does not describe a timeless singular 
event but rather a continuous process of development. An animal’s engagement with its milieu, 
and the manner in which this milieu is revealed to it is necessarily tied to the operative 
specificities of its species (genus). This is not to say that their is no objective determination of 
the world beyond subjective sensibility, but that the conditions under which this determination is 
recognized and therefore operated on are always revealed through the specific capacities of the 
subject. While this negatively sets the limits of the subject’s ability to discriminate the objects in 
the world, and therefore constrains its autonomy, it also positively enacts the real conditions 
under which these characteristic limits are ‘defined’ and in a sense ‘projected’ onto environing 
objects. This projection takes the form of value as its discrimination of objects is at once an 
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expression and an enabling of the subjective conditions of its being. In other words, when 
apprehending the object, this value expresses the adherence of a subject to the determined 
conditions of its development in the form of activity, but also the particular orientation given to 
the activity engaged within a given context33. From this, we can see that any subject, operating 
autonomously, always interacts with the world through practices which define its relation to that 
world and thus its identification with itself, whatever level it operates on, and therefore denotes 
its expressive capacity. 
 
“…[C]ette projection sur l’objet de la limitation immanente du sujet, de sa structure 
prédéterminée, c’est en même temps la projection vers lui de sa puissance propre d’agir; 
c’est la projection des passions en tant qu’énergie et pas comme simple passivité…”34 
 
The qualities of a specific type of being relate to the values it projects onto different objects, and 
the ensuing differential valuation fashions the world on which is established the ‘always already 
happening’ of its engagement with its milieu, including the manner of its expression. In other 
words, while the world determines the qualities of a being’s kind, the subjectivity arising from its 
specific conditions in turn frames the world accordingly. Thus within Freitag’s conception, this 
intervention of a relative ‘operational autonomy’ in the construction (objectivization) of the 
object within the constitution and reproduction of subjectivity in its existential mode of being is 
analytically recognized as the expressive moment of action.  
 It is important here to recognize the analytical antecedence attributed to the subject in the 
formal dialectical relation described here, as the determination of the object as object can only be 
made from the perspective of a subject. Stated otherwise, the formal possibility of 
subjectification implies the ‘beginning’ of world from the perspective of subjectivity coming into 
itself as if it was the initial cause of the deployment towards ‘reflexive worldliness’. The 
autonomy of the subject is therefore rooted in the world it objectivizes (as opposed to ‘coming 
from the outside’) and is tied to its own process of development35; the necessary attachment of 
subjectivity to the specificities of its being in the manner described above is itself a subjective 
attachment in the expression of its autonomy. In animals, this specificity is outlined in its kind, 
                                               
33Freitag, M. (2011) Dialectique et Société Vol.2: Introduction à une théorie générale du symbolique. Montréal: 
Liber; p.368-9. 
34 Ibid.; p.372-3.  
35 Ibid.; p.378; in Freitag’s words, “l’autocréation de la subjectivité par elle-même…” 
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as an obligation conditional to the reproduction (both biologically or genetically) and in the 
practical exuberance of its essence. In human beings, it is briefly stated their belonging to society 
and the sharing of a collective identity through which their irreducible individual identities take 
shape and manifests in the form of a ‘devoir-être’ towards its perennial collective renewal36. If 
the free play of the subject in its co-constitution in and of a world characterizes the expressive 
dimension of action, then the inverse re-inscription of the object within the subject characterizes 
the normative dimension, as the reciprocal moment within the constitution of the subject that 
keeps its expression either effectively or virtually grounded in reality.   
 This back and forth between the expressive and normative moments of subjectivity 
establishes Freitag’s use of the concept of ideology. No longer just a relation between individuals 
and the collective, this much wider sense of ideology encapsulates the very reproduction of the 
subject-object relation of sense experience, insofar as the object is necessarily objectified 
subjectively through its valuation. In the formal immediate - that is to say undifferentiated - 
symbolic relation, ideology is on a similar level as normativity in the manner just described. The 
distinction between the two concepts arrives with power, which elevates normativity beyond the 
intrinsic nature of the object and the immanent finality of action, and “externalizes it” through an 
imperative that from then on is sanctioned “from the outside, from above”37. This degree of 
separation also entails the reflexive recognition of the subject’s freedom of being in the world in 
relation to power. It stands from this that power for Freitag by definition involves a level of 
social legitimacy and recognition, as opposed to the exercise of simple domination or control38. 
In any case, ideology is the projection of the conditions of a structure and way of being that 
executes a normative figure within the subject. Freitag says it best: 
 
“L’idéologie est l’expression d’une structure tout aussi réelle que le monde social et 
naturel extérieur sur lequel elle est projetée, et elle détermine par conséquent d’une 
manière non moins pertinente le champ de toute objectivation […] Seulement cette 
pertinence n’est pas de l’ordre de la discrimination objective, mais de l’ordre de la valeur 
et des conditions réelles de la reproduction.39” 
 
                                               
36 Dialectique et Société Vol 2; p,378. 
37 Ibid., p.380.  
38 This will be pertinent as we contrast the contemporary mode of governance with its classically modern archetype. 
39 Ibid., p.398. 
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In a sense, ideology as a function is the inverse of reflexivity. The latter elevates the subject’s 
awareness of self above the more immediate subject-object relation where ideology renders the 
world not just through the subject’s expressive and uneven valuation of objects but also through 
the elevation of the object to the level of the activity in relation to it40. We will see now how the 
unity of the subject is established in this relation. 
 
 
II.ii The synthetic unity of transcendental identity 
 
 It should be specified that for Freitag, any form of reflexive subjectivity proper (of 
“symbolicity”, to be creative…) is always-already rooted in animal subjectivity and then within 
language as the virtual matrix of the symbolic. Animality here should be seen less as an initial or 
primitive condition of development, but rather as a substrate of symbolic existence; they simply 
coincide in the continuum of a “dynamic and synthetic” ontological structure, where animal 
sensibility is not only the origin of a humanizing process, but is “ontologically maintained at the 
heart of the entire human capacity of subjective synthesis deployed throughout the symbolic 
universe”41. Otherwise stated, we can understand this as the perennial process of a dialectical 
attachment to one’s initial condition as they enact the space for expression and growth42. The 
organic sensory experience enacts the conditions for a symbolic relation from which a formal 
relation can spring. This is because the formal represents an extra degree of separation from the 
material relation in that its enactment is with a virtual object that is nonetheless tied to the 
symbolic - and therefore real - conditions from which it springs, lest it be pure delusion43.   
 But assumed within the establishment of such a continuity, of an evolution or becoming of 
life within the dialectical modes of subjectivity, is the thesis of sense consciousness “unified in 
                                               
40 Dialectique et Société Vol 2, p.390.  
41 Freitag, M. (2001) ‘La dissolution postmoderne de l’identité transcendantale: la dialectique du rapport entre 
identité individuelle et forme de la participation sociale’ in Les solutions sociales de l’inconscient. Paris. Anthropos, 
p.76 - translation my own.  
42 The Hegelian dialectic formalizes this rather well. 
43 I am somewhat foreshadowing the forthcoming discussion on the nature of virtuality within cyberspace, but for 
now suffice to say that the idea of there being an ontological rupture between the virtual as ideal, and the virtual as 
reified, is one of the arguments this thesis will defend.  
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itself and for itself” in what Freitag refers to as the apriori unity of sensibility44, and what we 
might usually, although typically in a narrower sense, refer to as identity.  
 
“Mais dans toute cette dialectique, l’unité synthétique du sujet pour lui-même, son 
identité [emphasis my own], reste présupposée, et l’ensemble du procès n’existe qu’en 
autant qu’il se rapporte à elle, qu’il en soit justement l’expression, de telle façon que ce 
procès prend la valeur d’une autocréation du sujet, qui s’accumule précisément dans son 
identité et l’enrichissement de celle-ci, à mesure que l’expressivité revient du monde 
vers le sujet sous le mode de la normativité dans laquelle il assume lui-même son 
existence”45.  
 
The perennial interaction of a living organism with its environment presupposes two things. 
First, the fact of all living things having a specific unified “awareness” of their milieu (it could 
be consciousness of self in all its possible forms and not yet self-consciousness) rests on an a 
priori of differentiation or some original break or separation from it - a fundamental alterity 
presupposing the unity of sensibility. Second, that this unity of sensibility maintains itself within 
the continuity of the activity of life entails self-reference, which as already mentioned sets the 
limits of its activity not only negatively as boundary, but positively as specific capacity. 
Accordingly, the unity of this set of activities in its self-recognition possesses a transcendental 
character in so far as its essence cannot be immediately totalized within a particular activity, but 
merely defer to it. So in the animal, whatever transcends its awareness is immanent through the 
mode of its genus, in that “every singular living being itself participat[es], empirically, in the 
reproduction and deployment of this transcendental dimension”46. To make a quick contrast, the 
symbolic manifests to a higher degree of self-recognition where this transcendance is interiorized 
as a norm from within the reflexive objectivity of the subject. As self-recognition manifests of a 
higher degree of autonomy relative to the world, then its attachment is correspondingly elevated 
to an abstraction of a similar nature i.e the symbolic.   
 The socio-symbolic subject accesses the world in its alterity from the possibility of his or 
her expression and representation through language, since it is through language that objects gain 
signification as a concept, a significance which transcends their empirical manifestations. 
                                               
44 Identité transcendantale, p.76-7. 
45 Dialectique et Société Vol. 2, p.412. 
46 Identité transcendantale, p.80 - translation my own.  
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Ontologically, symbolic language thus resides in reflexive objectivization -  to use a 
Heideggerian term, it is “world-building”47. It is the elevation of a very real relation to the world 
that already mediates intersubjective animal communication, and thus as Freitag himself puts it,  
 
“…c’est la médiation elle-même qui se trouve objectivée et instituée comme telle, et qui 
acquiert le statut ontologique d’une réalité en soi et pour soi, existant comme telle en 
dehors et au-dessus des sujets particuliers de l’expérience communicationelle, lesquels 
alors doivent aussi s’y référer en extériorité tout en étant englobés par elle48.”   
 
The matrix for this system of signs which encapsulates the world of symbolic experience is 
found within narrative, which itself discloses and contains the myriad archetypes through which 
symbolic subjects recognize themselves and others in their respective unity. As part of the 
condition of possibility for reciprocity and recognition between different symbolic beings, a 
generalized other that describes “the mode of alterity which in advance designates the circle of 
virtual alter egos, and that can also be designated as ‘an ideal or transcendental other’” must 
exist, indicating the “them” from which a “we” arises49. Symbolic identity is thus not merely 
contained in the transcendantal qualities of kind which circumscribe animal activity from which 
we came, but exteriorized within the scope of a language that a priori defines the manner in 
which objects - virtual and empirical - are reflexively disclosed in their representation50. 
 The various socio-historical forms of subjectivity in their identitary synthesis and mode of 
reproduction are thus manifest of different terms of “transcendentalization”. The transcendental 
value of a given societal type cannot simply be reduced to an ideology in which daily living is 
oriented, but is that which exceeds every individual expression (action) in a symbolic way of 
being, providing sense or meaning to any action to the extent that the expression is recognizable 
                                               
47 Hence Heidegger’s assertion that animals are “poor in world”. This distance equally makes sense of the 
affirmative manner in which Hegel used the term “alienation”; as the coming-to-presence of the spirit, its 
immanence in the world; Reflexive subjectivity entails a doubling over of the constitutive distance with the object, 
itself “objectified” subjectively in the imposition of a virtual sign over its concrete determination.  
48 Identité transcendantale, p.82. This is why for Freitag, the causal chain between symbolic language and narrative 
must be reversed: rather than view language as an a priori to the existence of narrative, it is precisely in its becoming 
narrative (myth) that “an animal communication system became language”, and there are various possible 
hypotheses for the manner of its occurence that are beyond the purposes of this discussion.  
49 Freitag, M. (2006) ‘Identité, altérité et politique’ in L’oubli de la société. Pour une théorie critique de la 
postmodernité. Québec: Presses de l’Université de Laval; p.188.  
50 Hence the real difference between language as a formal concept, and the fact that we are always communicating 
and expressing ourselves within a specific language. 
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to oneself and to the other in its relation of transcendence. It is figurative of ideology in both 
senses of the word. 
 
 
II.iii The technical moment of action in subjectivity and its immediacy within the symbolic  
 
 For Freitag, technique is the alignment of the independent or autonomous operations of the 
subject with the empirical determinations of the ‘objective’ world, where action is intentionally 
oriented towards an efficient adjustment of the subject’s milieu51. Every intentional action 
therefore carries a technical dimension. On the level of animality, this technical dimension is 
undissociated from its biological being in the manner of its belonging both to a particular kind 
and to the active execution of this kind in individual behaviour. In other words, given that the 
“objective ends” of activity are immanent to both the animal’s essence (its genus within beings) 
and its existence (its distinctiveness of being), which are as much the result of adaptive necessity 
as that of a relative freedom that the organism entertains with its milieu52, the technical aspect of 
action inherent to animal activity is therefore in itself ontologically indissociable from the other 
moments of its nature (the expressive-normative moments of subjectification). 
 This is true of the symbolic as well, although for more nuanced reasons: While technique is 
immanent to any action in the world, it remains necessarily consonant with the other moments of 
action since its ontological distinction from them would imply the objectivation of the end in 
which it was carried out. In practical terms, this means that the ability to conceive of an activity 
as purely technical or efficient presupposes a subjective differentiation of the end sought from 
                                               
51 La nature de la technique; p.329.  
52  Ibid.; p.337-8. Here Freitag is heavily influenced by the zoologist Adolf Portmann. Briefly, the evolution and 
growth over immeasurable periods of time of biological forms testifies as much to the manner in which animals 
freely express themselves in relation to their biological capacities as the adaptive necessities of their environment. 
The idea is that biological processes eventually crystallize into habits, into reflexes, and suppressed into instinct as 
part of any organism’s continuous interaction with the world in which it dwells, and as the autonomy of these 
embodied processes (within the realm of the biological what we call organs) increases, the world is disclosed to the 
organism in a way that is specific to its kind and thus constitutes the very totality of its sense experience, including 
awareness if not of itself, then of its relation to other organisms. 
 Otherwise, it seems relevant to bring up the research of the biologist Jacob von Uexküll. His extensive 
studies in the environmental perception of non-human living beings led to the now seemingly banal idea that beings 
always inhabit the world in subjective frames of references that he called Umwelt, a term later appropriated by 
Heidegger in his typologies of worldliness of being.  
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the worldly means of its achievement, bestowing upon the world an objectivity that is no longer 
dependent on the activities tied to social reproduction53. We will return to this later on.   
 However, such is not the case within a relatively unified and undifferentiated form of 
social regulation and reproduction as that evidenced within cultural-symbolic societies, where 
efficiency of technique is immediately confounded with language and culture as an active part in 
the reproduction of both the subject’s existential world and the regulation of social practices. 
“The properly technical moment of human action” says Freitag, “in effect remains undissociated 
from the other epistemic moments of action”: What is realized outside “the organic being of 
man”, is culture understood globally in its material as well as symbolic aspects in their mutual 
referral54. With technique, means and ends are therefore identical with each other in so far as a 
normative symbolic relation to reality is concerned. The formal technical dimension of action is 
inscribed within the other constitutive moments of human activity which comprise its realization. 
In this manner, tools do not have any instrumental quality, but are rather tied to the being-in-the-
world in which the users, the objects they are used on, and the end of their use all coincide into 
the order of the world and generate meaning. Within a structure of ontological reciprocal 
belonging of individual, society, and nature, in which there is an ontological reciprocity between 
subject and society, 
 
“l’action ne se présente pas comme un faire au sens d’un fabriquer, mais comme une 
‘production’ au sens originel de producere, conduire à l’avant-plan, faire venir dans la 
manifestation quelque chose qui se tient en soi dans la profondeur latente ou cachée de 
son être”55.  
 
What is manifest in action is in a sense the belonging of the act itself to the world “understood in 
its double subjective and objective dimension”; the act is a revealing of what is latent in but 
already belonging to the world (likewise for tools). In this context, the instrumental value within 
                                               
53 La nature de la technique; p.330. Two analytical observations: Any historical investigation on the nature of 
technique in its specificity within action and the symbolic is up to a certain point retrospective and anachronistic 
until the proper conditions of its autonomy are observed. Also, thinking schematically we can imagine how the 
extraction of either end of the normative or the expressive pole of subjective synthesis necessarily entails pulling at 
the other in their co-constitution. However, the technical moment can only be seized in its specificity or autonomy 
outside the normative relation (the return within the subject).  
54 Ibid., p.339. 
55 Ibid., p.340. 
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action is yet to be disclosed; efficiency has yet to determine an end for itself, but is merely part 
of action in its revelation. 
 It follows from this that the appearance of technique in its specificity cannot really be 
conceived without the consideration of some form of social differentiation on the level of action 
and of society in its practices. One of the most fundamental (and earliest) of such differentiations 
at the existential level was the separation of nature and society instigated as a consequence of 
agricultural practices56 as a relative appropriation of nature (in contrast to the immediacy of 
living with nature). In practice, the fruits of nature now require an activity of production which 
not only dissociates possession from usage, but also temporalizes the act of appropriation and the 
reaping of rewards (and thus the value of phenomena is no longer immediate but rather 
‘invested’. Imminent to these existential separations is a differentiation of the conditions of 
access, divorced from the strength to act inherent to one’s essence or nature (since the activity 
itself is no longer immediately ‘natural’, but mediated by an act of labour) and thus the 
recognition of a symbolic mode of regulation above the natural attributions of might - hence the 
appearance of power as regulation in symbolic recognition, the result of the differentiation of 
activity at the beginning of traditional societies. It is in this context that we come across the 
artisan, who in a sense will not only exemplify, both virtually and concretely, the structural 
changes in the conditions of regulation and integration at the heart of early agricultural societies, 
but also embody the significance of technique in the current historical analysis.  
 
 
II.iv From the artisan to the engineer 
 
 Despite the differentiation of activity within the structure of agricultural societies, the 
practices manifest of the phenomenological separations cascading from the separation of nature 
and society were not enough to instigate the autonomous appearance of technique (and therefore 
a distinctly instrumental or efficient moment within action) since culture and language still 
maintained a strong normative hold on the symbolic, and nature was still culturally apprehended 
in terms of one’s dependency towards it. So while the arrival of agriculture was insufficient in 
                                               
56 Generally coinciding with the era of history we classically describe as Neolithic.   
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the outlining of a properly technical moment, it nonetheless set the conditions for the emergence 
of power within a division of labour in which tools and their producers would effervesce. 
 The rise of the artisan and their accompanying ‘trades’ in agricultural practices is tied to 
the appearance and generalized use of tools. As pointed out, the phenomenological separation of 
the activity of “production” from the immediacy of nature in symbolic existence entails the 
constitution of the “product” as the result of human activity as opposed to the direct offerings of 
nature. Yet on its own this opened up the possibility of the separation of means and ends, in a 
way captured in the constitution of the “tool” as an instrument detached from the conceptual 
unity of the “productive” act57. However, the production of these tools was itself specialized, 
giving light to artisanal trades which - to repeat - exemplify the structural changes and 
differentiation of roles and activities that resulted from agricultural practices. 
 
“Ce qui caractérise d’abord l’activité artisanale, c’est que le savoir et le savoir-faire qui y 
sont mis en oeuvre n’appartiennent plus à l’univers structurellement unifié et 
épistémiquement synthétique de la culture commune: ils sont détachés du logos qui était 
commun au monde et aux hommes. Du même coup cette activité échappe aussi au 
contrôle normatif de la culture, et ce n’est plus que par la double médiation déjà 
extérieure du statut social de l’artisan et de la valeur (d’usage d’abord) conférée par 
autrui à son produit qu’elle s’intègre dans l’ensemble des pratique sociales et dans le 
procès global de reproduction de la société”58. 
 
The artisan’s practice is severed from the common world in its social phenomenological 
significance, and in this sense is outsider to the immediately normative control of culture. 
However, his relation to the commons is one of dependence, intrinsically tied to others since the 
value of his production is tied to their practices and judgements. In other words, the practice and 
essence of the artisan as a social actor is defined by its exteriority, simultaneously confirming the 
differential quality (the symbolic meaning) of his status. This confirmation evidences the 
actuality and recognition of power as a regulative force, as opposed to a mere opposition of 
strength, since the separation of producer and end-user and the sanction guaranteeing their 
reciprocity is symbolically recognized and redoubled in the specialized character of the artisan’s 
                                               
57 La nature de la technique, p.348. 
58 Ibid., p.349. As Freitag notes, “…celui qui produit pour d’autres, et qui dépend des autres pour la satisfaction de 
ses propres besoins, produit alors aussi la différence entre le faire, l’avoir et l’être, la dissociation ontologique de la 
nécessité et de la liberté, le jeu éthique entre le tout et la partie, l’individu et la société, et finalement l’opposition 
entre le moyen et la fin…”. 
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craft, immanent of an esoteric know-how outside the purviews of common knowledge to which 
it owes its legitimacy. So while the objectivization of producer against user and product sets the 
conditions for the autonomy of technique within an activity of production, it is nonetheless 
mediated by a normative structure inherently limiting the instrumental part of the activity; its 
meaning is not derived from its instrumentality.  
 But what about the tools themselves? In Freitag’s analysis, the particular status of the 
artisan involves the reflexive objectification of the tool as a tool (as distinct from an instrument 
or personal ability). The value of the tool is yet expressive in that it is still immediately manifest 
of its end - of the potentiality of the artisan in nature. However, its ‘virtue’ is in the specificity of 
its use and evinces a reflexively determined instrumental efficiency, splitting the means from the 
end. This implies that the tool bears its own capacity, and can itself be transformed or produced 
towards the improvement of that end59. Through the tool, the archetype of the artisan can 
actualize the claim that technique within action requires the reflexive objectivization of an 
activity of production. But as mentioned above, artisanal skills have yet to be universalized under 
the umbrella of a generalized technical craft, and the practices and know-how of each trade 
remain particular just as much as the end or the ‘product’60. Ultimately, the instance of a 
multitude of techniques in which the normative sanctions regulating the symbolic value and the 
use of their finality (their ‘products’) are tied to their specific ends, combined with the structural 
doubling over of this normative relation in the dependent though exteriorized status of the artisan 
within the community, prevents technique from emerging as a distinctive instrumental capacity 
within action, despite being fecund with the conditions of possibility for its symbolic distinction. 
But it is precisely these traditional and early modern social symbolic structural conditions - the 
formal separation of means and ends, of product and producer, of work (as an act of production) 
and art (as an act of expression) - embodied in the artisan that will be unleashed with their 
universalization within a market economy. 
 From an analytical perspective, the formal conditions of a generalized market are not novel 
and necessarily begin with the possibility of assessing the value of goods in terms of an exchange 
value that is abstracted from its use and therefore virtually commensurable with other forms of 
                                               
59 La nature de la technique, p.361. 
60 Needless to remind one of the fact that this ‘product’ (4 causes gathered) is defined by the collective in its use 
value. 
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value61. Inevitable to this abstraction is the signifying of a universal and formally distinct 
concept of “production” since the production of the object is the only concrete link reconciling 
the totality of exchange values, which in turn universalizes and distinguishes “labour” as the sign 
of activity of production. And given that production is tied to the exchange value of the product, 
and therefore is itself endowed with an exchange value that is commensurable and therefore 
measurable with its end, then the efficiency of production as a process encompassing the activity 
involved in the end is also finally measurable in terms of value. Analogous to the formal 
conditions of exchange value was the concrete universalization of the market itself, and to the 
subsequent measurable valuation of work the labour market inducing the reduction of the 
specificities of different trades into a “work force”62. The liberation and subsequent 
universalization of technique corresponding to the realization of the specificity of efficiency 
within activity itself entailed on one hand the transfer and mobilization of skills across different 
industries and on the other the “reduction” of diverse techniques into more formal, uniform 
kinds. Otherwise stated, the structural features of artisanal practice depicted above are dissolved 
with the generalizations of product, production, and producer, which itself is bound to the 
shattering of the artisan into distinctly opposed figures of the new labour force: the manual 
worker, the artist, and the engineer63. 
 Recall that the traditional artisan was defined by the realization of products that were 
already predetermined in their value according to his or her role within the collective and the 
relatively opaque history of practices which culminated into the particularities of the craft. In 
modernity, the artisan will no longer identity with the specifics of a trade, but with what the 
production refers to. In the case of art, it is the aesthetic idea contained yet transcending the 
creation, the oeuvre, which outlines it against labour, whose production is in the context of a 
market aimed towards the end of an exchange value. As such, activities differentiate according to 
their respective ends, but will nonetheless be reconciled in the universal categories of Reason 
                                               
61 This is “Marx 101”. If an exchange value was determined by a specific natural or material property of an object, 
we could not establish a clear value that can be equaled with other objects, since objects are deemed useful by these 
material properties. If they could be equated in the same way as an exchange value, they would be drained of their 
use-value. What’s the point of using a hammer to put in a nail if an apple will do the same thing?  
62 La nature de la technique; p.365. 
63 We will return to this shortly, but the breakdown of these features is also attributable to the rise of scientific 
ideology which increasingly generalized a new conception of nature through mechanics (physics) and kinetics 
(chemistry). 
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and emancipation which transcend them, rather than being directly submitted to the regulatory 
sanctions of traditional power.    
 
“Ainsi, la société aura des artistes et elle se reconnaîtra en eux. Mais elle aura aussi des 
juristes, définis non plus par leur profession, mais par l’idéalité du droit à la réalisation 
duquel ils collaborent en son nom et pour elle. Ainsi en va-t-il des savants, des 
enseignants, des médecins, même des entrepreneurs et, last but not least, des travailleurs. 
[…] Or tous ces gens, concrètement, accomplissent dans la société une fonction 
particulière et adoptent un identité différente, qui cependant convergent touts dans 
l’idéalité qui les unit comme […] membres de la société civile porteurs principiellement 
des mêmes droits”64. 
 
Abiding by Freitagian terminology, the synthesis of subjective identity is reconciled and 
preserved at “a higher level” in the ideological recognition of power made legitimate in the 
practices and ends of different institutions. The different dimensions of action (cognitive, 
normative, expressive) are emancipated from each other within specific institutional moments 
and unified at a “higher level” of legitimacy through the general recognition of power, which in 
the case of modern societies was generally embodied by the centralized state as the upholder of 
law and the mechanism under which individual freedom can be exercised and maintained65 
(Many of these “forks” arose from ‘culture’ as well, but the institutionalization of individual 
rights under law succinctly sum up the overarching ideology under which these differentiations 
in practice and signification not only occurred, but reproduced and evolved epistemically66). So 
for example, with the cognitive dimension, stripped of both the normative structure and the 
expressive ends of which it had been inscribed in traditional and primitive societies, came the 
rise of modern science, “understood as the free research of positive truth, and regulated 
exclusively by its own epistemological and methodological rules”67 essentially calling for the 
suppression of the normative-expressive moment in its drive towards objectivity68. So while by 
no means exclusive and concrete, the symbolic objectivization of a productive activity 
                                               
64 Identité transcendantale; p.104. 
65 La nature de la technique; p.372. 
66 With regards to the status of art, its separation from artisanal labour outlined it against the category of work and 
over time was legitimated through different categories of expression for what constitutes the art form starting with 
the renaissance. 
67 La nature de la technique, p.373. 
68 Dialectique et Société Vol. 2, p.363-5. 
 31 
distinguishes it from its expression, itself now recognized as being of a different essence. With 
regards to its technical aspects, specific techniques developed for each institutional iteration of a 
form of action within the symbolic, with each of these particular techniques characterizing and 
legitimizing action through some transcendental referent reconciling the ends from the means, 
and in this sense the technical moment was still subordinate to an activity’s universal expression.  
 No role better embodied the universality of technique within modern industrial society than 
the engineer, hired by the entrepreneur as a universal technician, in a sense mirroring the 
conceptual unity of technique encapsulated in the machine. For Freitag, this rise of the machine 
in the context of industrialization symbolizes the historical moment at which technique formally 
reveals itself in an autonomous capacity; the moment in which, in the context of our discussion, 
we abandon the conceptual anachronism and technique becomes realized in its concrete reality69. 
This is an important milestone as it equally signifies the constitution of the autonomy of the 
instrumentality of action; technique is at this point fully exteriorized beyond the synthesis of the 
different categories of action in the symbolic subject. It also entails action’s formal indifference 
from the end, in that the end is no longer contained within the phenomenal significance of action 
as such because it has been universalized objectively in the form of “value” and subjectively in 
the form of “need”70. Furthermore, the instrumental rationality characterizing industrialization 
implies the general possibility of calculating and researching the indefinite growth of efficiency, 
which itself is effectuated in the epistemic condition of progress understood as the perennial 
advancement of the satisfaction of needs in the pursuit of happiness. For this reason however, 
and consonant with its other institutional manifestations, technique within industrial mechanical 
production is still grounded and legitimized in modern rationalism and is still a socio-historical 
human affair insofar as in it is expressed the universalization of the subject’s transcendental 






                                               
69 La nature de la technique, p.366. 
70 Ibid.; p.369. 
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III. THE GENERALIZATION OF TECHNIQUE IN PRACTICE 
 
III.i The transcendental individual and the aporia of science 
 
 Tracing the circumstances under which society delivered itself over to the possibility of 
undoing the aforementioned transcendental referents binding technique within action requires a 
look into the rise of science, its epistemological double, and how the former came to be steadily 
appropriated within the capitalist production process in the disintegration of the latter, only to 
morph into practices of direct technical intervention with regards to nature (from then on 
conceptualized as the “environment”) and social life.   
 However, similar to the appearance of technique within action through the historical 
differentiation of social practices, this mutation did not merely occur on its own within a 
teleology of increasing complexification, and I must make sense of these changes by elaborating 
on the conditions of its symbolic possibility. In effect, modern society - in its innumerable 
derivations - can be ideal-typically characterized as the progressive inauguration of a formally 
secularized universal ideal explicitly forged in a battle against tradition71. No more shall the 
individual be subject to the shackles of doctrine and myth, and will rather be governed by self-
knowledge, by his or her use of Reason towards the ideal of Truth. The gradual deployment of 
Reason as logos, as a matrix of being-in-the-world, fundamentally changed the mode of the 
subject’s symbolic relation to nature (alterity against the world), to itself (alterity of being in self-
recognition, self-identity) and to history (alterity with regards to humanity, identity as belonging 
to). In other words, the conditions of possibility of the subject’s being (and of its being free) 
directly arise from the individual, and it is now the various ways in which the subject enacts and 
participates within Reason that will justify its activity. Epistemologically, the modern subject 
interiorizes the transcendance of the world, and his self-conscience and application of knowledge 
becomes the source from which emanates all; the political production of society and mastery of 
the knowledge and use of the empirical world. Structurally, this means that the legislative 
capacity of power no longer emanates from concrete endowments incarnating a transcendent 
                                               
71 We’d remind the reader that the typology of modern vs traditional societies here derives less from an 
essentializing categorization retrospectively historicizing progress, but from a political self-definition in the use and 
practice of reason against the shackles of traditional society. 
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origin, but from the idea of natural rights emanating from subjects proper, formally upheld by 
law and recognized by the state in its activities of governance (political representation). It also 
means that the normative regulations of modern societies will be progressively reformulated 
within institutional frameworks characterized by these transcendant (universal) ideals72. 
 I mentioned above how, within this ideal-typical description of the evolution of the modes 
of action and practice, modern science arose out of the reflexive deliverance of the cognitive 
moment of identitary synthesis. According to its own terms, science was not defined by the 
phenomenological study of the cognitive relation to the world, “in the phenomenon of 
knowledge in itself”, but rather in the “search for an objective knowledge apprehended from the 
outset in the perspective of its controlled and cumulative growth”73. We can say that, in a similar 
movement to the technical dimension of action, the cognitive apprehension of the world was 
exteriorized in scientific practices and reintegrated ideologically as the engine of indefinite 
progress. I say engine because it was indeed science that steadily appropriated for itself the 
legitimate means by which the expansion of one’s Reason could be delivered.  
 However, the conditions under which this expansion could be effective and maintained, the 
terms under which science can exercise itself, fell under the sphere of philosophical inquiry that 
grounded scientific practice in the growth of knowledge and the expansion of Reason. The study 
of the world in classical science is driven by the contemplation of its immanent harmony 
reminiscent of the theoria of Greek antiquity. Whether it be logos as the manner in which the 
world discloses itself, or the divine order of the workings of nature and the cosmos, attempts at 
the rationalisation of the world in either case refer to the possibility of its unveiling. As Olivier 
Clain - a sociologist largely aligned with Freitag on the historical object of science - put it when 
he wrote about rationalism and empiricism in their effervescence:  
 
“…la philosophie moderne qui s’est présentée, pour l’essentiel, comme critique 
épistémologique, conservait une visée ontologique. Certes elle saisissait la connaissance 
d’un point de vue instrumental mais elle ne le faisait que pour mieux atteindre le vrai74.” 
 
All the same, the principle point of divergence for scientific practice resided in its emphasis on 
demonstration and experimentation, for if the one true certainty of knowledge emerges from the 
                                               
72 Identité transcendantale, p.100-3. 
73 Dialectique et Société Vol. 2, p.362. - translation my own. 
74 Clain, O. (1989) ‘Sur la science contemporaine’ in Société No 4. p.106. 
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individual’s sense experience (to not say the cogito), then the empirical verification of 
phenomena testifies to the terms under which the broadening of knowledge can be secured. The 
reasons for this are thus not merely methodological, but also ontological: The obverse of an 
individual transcendental subject endowed with Reason is a nature established in exteriority on 
which Reason is exercised. Nature no longer speaks, but is silent in the face of beings that must 
speak on its behalf in disclosing its truths. Freitag writes, 
 
“Pour parler lui-même à son propre compte, l’homme scientifique n’est pas seulement 
entré dans la parole, il n’est pas seulement entré en possession de la parole dans le 
partage de la parole: il en a fait sa propriété exclusive. Il a donc aussi présenté cette 
propriété comme originelle, comme le produit accumulé de son propre travail, du travail 
exclusif de sa raison et de sa méthode75”. 
 
The formal separation of nature and society thus entails the condition that the proliferation of 
truth and the expansion of reason begins from the subject’s methodical intervention aimed at 
unraveling nature’s inner workings. Or from another angle, we can say that deriving from the 
epistemological dualism of subject and object - the definite severance of the critical scientist 
from nature inherent to the transcendental subject of modern philosophy, was the concern for the 
conditions under which (scientific) knowledge could be nurtured and expanded, but this 
preoccupation eventually subsumed contemplating the possibility of knowledge in itself. It 
follows that the terms under which reason could proliferate would fall under the exclusivity of 
the expansion of scientific knowledge against other forms of knowing now asserted negatively as 
‘ideological’. Not only did scientific epistemology therefore take up the “identification of the 
problem of truth” and equate it with the scientificity of knowledge, but also followed with the 
“polemical exclusion of all the non-scientific relations to objects, and its critical analyses, in the 
field of general knowledge”76. 
 With the support of modern epistemology, science eventually rid itself of the “existential 
depth” of the subject now on ‘the outside looking into’ the world, for that is the domain of 
Reason’s proper expansion. In so far as it consecrated itself atop this aporia, it was bound to lead 
to periods of crisis, being necessarily and increasingly constrained by its own rules. Yet it must 
                                               
75 Freitag, M. (2011) Dialectique et Société Vol.1: La connaissance sociologique. Montréal: Liber; p.72. 
76 Dialectique et société, Vol. 1; p.177. - translation my own. 
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be stressed that it was because of its singular focus on the conditions of Truth against a negative 
field (non-scientific knowledge or ideology - essentially social reality) on which the legitimacy 
of its practice nonetheless found salience outside of its domain.  
 
 
III.ii Paradigm shifts and the technicisation of knowledge 
 
 The turning point for Freitag was not one of overcoming but of complete dissolution, 
which can be seen as culminating in the analyses of Thomas Kuhn in The structure of scientific 
revolutions. In his analysis, Kuhn empirically examines the socio-historical forms of scientific 
practice and demonstrates that the activities of scientists involves the utilization of collective 
research models that do not align with the logical characteristics and normative values of 
epistemology; their practices are not guided by some formal and universal scientific principles 
that constitute its own logic distinct from any other practice. Scientists rather engage in problem-
solving by conglomerating into groups and pragmatically devising strategic procedures around 
specific questions while research interests are oriented in a corresponding manner. It is only in 
crisis that scientific practice reflects on the validity of its procedures. But this reflection, rather 
than re-aligning its processes with norms established epistemologically, instigates a paradigm 
shift that is irreducible to the last77. Different paradigms are confronted, engaged strategically (as 
opposed to rationally), and driven by the self-interest of researchers, and their discontinuity for 
Kuhn speaks to the lack of a consistent scientific narrative. Freitag thus writes, 
 
“En substituant ainsi le concept de réalité objective la notion de problème à résoudre 
(puzzle solving), Kuhn consacre dans le champ de l’épistémologie l’attitude pragmatiste 
et opérationnelle propre aux discipline techniques, et il réalise donc une émancipation 
définitive de la pratique scientifique à l’égard du problème de vérité. […] 
Symétriquement, l’idée d’une consistance et d’une unité ontologique transcendantales du 
monde objectif […] s’efface de l’horizon…78” 
 
                                               
77 Kuhn, T.S. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
78 Ibid., p.218. As Freitag notes, what is abolished here can be reduced to the Kantian distinction between 
phenomena and noumena, between what is apprehended and what is contained in itself. 
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This marks a profound departure from modern epistemology. While it was progressively strained 
within the epistemological dualism described above (on both a logical and metaphysical basis), it 
nonetheless retained the normative account of an objective world that can be known and its 
truths divulged contra sense experience. As Clain notes, Kuhn’s “épistemo-socio-logie” of 
science renounces the specificity of science with regards to common knowledge, and while it 
remains ideological to the extent that “it continues to develop its ontological prejudices of being 
and knowledge”, it alleges to “renounce normativity in any manner”79. In other words, it 
renounces the idea of the theoretical accumulation of knowledge and retrospectively erases the 
historical specificity of scientific practice and development all the while imposing an operational 
(organizational) model of science as the basis of its function. From the epistemological dualism 
of modern science we arrive at an “operational monism” in which the only ontology that subsists 
is the virtual calculability and measure of an object in its operations80. 
 I explained above how classical and modern sciences distinguished themselves from other 
secular knowledge practices through their strict reliance on experimentation and demonstration, 
as empirical verification would not only ground the certainty of knowledge but also allow for its 
expansion. Yet, the same applies for the bolstering of empirical verification itself, as technique a 
priori prescribes the possible forms overlaying the experiment81. While discovery necessarily 
leads to technical advance as the scope of knowledge and the possibilities therein widens, the 
experimental procedure was nonetheless subordinate to the theories of reality on which its 
legitimacy rests. In other words, technique as the productive moment of scientific activity was 
secondary to the vectors of knowledge verified and captured in theory. In light of Kuhn’s 
reasoning, what we see is a change in the dynamic between theory and technique: As science 
loses its transcendental ideal of Truth in favour of an environmental operationnality, the ends of 
theory and the ends of technique tend to be confounded in way that the former is sublimated 
within the later.  
 Furthermore and in parallel to this, recall that technique in industrial production was still 
grounded in an ideal of progress on which rested the eventual emancipation of the transcendental 
subject. This was the finality inscribing itself within each institutional domain in which the ends 
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of particular techniques were united in spite of a clear differentiation of the means and ends 
implicit with technique’s formal objectivation. In short, technique “would remain subordinate to 
normative and expressive ends”, and final judgment was not strictly technical, but would 
essentially remain one of value82. Alas, this is precisely what tends to decompose under Kuhn’s 
socio-epistemology. In dissolving the specificity of theory within practice, that is to say, 
reducing the cognitive end of symbolic signification characterizing science to the same 
ontological level as its practice, the meaning of scientific practice tends to generalize itself in its 
operability, which is to say its technical possibilities. There is no longer any “virtual unity of 
knowledge”83 nor any particular end which the cognitive activities of science aim towards 
outside of the specific conditions of operability which enable the control or mastery of its object.  
 
III.iii Information as ontology  
 
 Parallel to the eventual supersedure of theory by technique in scientific practice was an 
increasing horizontalization of the subject and thus of the greater society as a whole within the 
world. With the virtual dissolution of the modern transcendental subject, it was the behaviourist 
cybernetic informational subject that by the height of the post-war years had taken over the scene 
as the model of humanity on which techno-scientific practices operate to this today. As Clain 
says,  
 
“C’est la cybernétique qui devient ‘la science formelle’ de la ‘techno-science’, non pas 
qu’elle incarne alors l’apodicité aux yeux de celle-ci ou de l’épistémologie, mais plutôt 
parce qu’aussi bien en regard du pragmatisme épistémologique que du technicisme des 
sciences empiriques la cybernétique apparait comme un modèle d’opérativité”84. 
 
The model of operability Clain alludes to is not simply innate to cybernetic epistemology, but is 
an avowed statement of purpose. Emerging from the scientific research proceedings of world war 
II, the self-proclaimed ‘new science’ of cybernetics was defined by its founder, Norbert Wiener, 
                                               
82 La nature de la technique, p.373 - translation my own. 
83  Dialectique et Société, Vol. 1, p.219.  
84 Sur la science contemporaine, p.120. 
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as the “scientific study of communication and control in the animal and the machine”85. Its three 
core concepts, entropy, information, and feedback, are intimately interlaced in forging the a 
priori principles on which the entire cybernetic framework is erected. Information in particular 
has a specific, although generalized quality in cybernetics: No longer arbitrarily characterized as 
a series of semiotic and linguistic signifiers, it is rather conceived as the ether on which we can 
make sense of the very form of any system’s organization. It is useable insofar as it is a 
quantifiable physical principle86. Feedback is the primary means through which the treatment of 
information within a system is conceived, orienting action towards the maintenance of 
equilibrium within outside noise. Together, these concepts both constitute and render manifest 
the cybernetic conception of communication as the means to fend off entropy which, issuing 
from the 2nd law of thermodynamics, is the general tendency of the organization of information 
within any system to move towards absolute homogeneity. That is to say, systemic degradation 
reaches a point where the elements are all perfectly and evenly distributed with regards to each 
other, and therefore no relation as such can any longer be conceived87.  
 Conceptually, the subjectivity emanating from this picture of reality descends from 
behaviourism, itself highly influenced by Darwinian theories of evolution. Relying on a 
stimulus-response schema, all human action, including thought itself, is the result of adaptation 
in harmony with the subject’s environment. Its promoter, John Watson, aimed to increase control 
over conduct and behaviour through scientific prediction88. No doubt this was a big influence on 
cybernetics. However, this link sheds light on the fact that behaviourism’s most important 
contribution to Wiener and his colleagues was arguably the displacement of scientific analysis 
from the structure and composition of an object to the relation between an object and its 
environment89. The big difference is that while behaviourism undid the boundary between 
animals and human beings in focussing on biological systems, cybernetics is even more radical 
in doing away with any substantial difference between beings and machines, since both simply 
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constitute a particular iteration of a system of information organized against entropy. Here, 
human behaviour is essentially likened to a complex feedback mechanism; in so far as the 
system operates on the communication of information between different states, there is no 
fundamental difference between different forms of action, whether they be empirical or virtual, 
reflexive or unintentional. This is predominantly made possible by the manner in which 
cyberneticists conceptualized and operationalized information.  
 More than a simple methodological strategy, information’s immateriality is in a manner of 
speaking ontological to cybernetics; it has no phenomenological significance. Information is 
spatially flat and temporally linear (as opposed to “thick”, in the Husserlian sense, which speaks 
to information’s relative estrangement from any phenomenological considerations regarding 
sense experience). All operations are ordered according to a numerical logic that collapses any 
and all phenomena into links within a sequence describing a process and its continuous 
transformations90. This already alludes to its second characteristic: Information is infinitely 
applicable. It can transform anything into anything else, regardless of the medium. As Hayles 
notes, the possibility of securing the totality of all possible material instantiations in information 
so that it may be universally communicable greatly eases the conceptual flow between different 
mediums. Whether it be organic or artificial is unimportant91. Inversely, it is precisely because of 
this property that what the meaning of information is in itself is irrelevant to the context. As 
demonstrated earlier on, if information is tied to meaning, then it would have to change its value 
every time it was embedded within a new context, “because context affects meaning”92. This 
notion and all the subsequent theoretical chimeras it instigated led theorists into an irreconcilable 
gap between the universality (action; what it does) of information within the system and its 
representability (what it describes; what it is); the problem they faced was that of narrowing the 
field of experience into the system without diminishing the nature of information's transmission. 
In the end, and echoing the above critique of scientific epistemology, the immateriality of 
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information and its subsequent divorce of meaning from context did not derive from a wholly 
conceptual decision - a Truth conjecture - but rather, as Hayles noted, was “necessitated by 
engineering considerations”93. Nonetheless, it hardly discounts the ontological equation between 




III.iv New technical horizons of social organization  
 
The “epistemo-socio-logie” of normal science and the prior arrival of cybernetics could be seen 
as evincing general tendencies that were already salient in other areas of society. In Freitag’s 
mind, Kuhn’s theories can easily be conceived as merely a ‘sign of the times’: 
 
“Mais on peut bien penser que l’oeuvre de Kuhn ne signifie que la reconnaissance 
officielle du changement d’attitude qui s’était déjà largement opéré dans les pratiques 
scientifiques elles-mêmes, à mesure qu’elles abandonnaient leur réflexivité critique pour 
adopter une perspective opérationnelle à caractère technocratique, et que la figure sociale 
du savant faisait place à celle du chercheur professionnel”94. 
 
The reversal of theory and practice in science - the melding of its normative and technical ends, 
was in a sense telling of both its fate and that of capital. Central to our concerns was the fact that 
for almost a full century before Kuhn delivered his contentious thesis, the cognitive activities of 
science and the productive capacities of industry were increasingly courting each other through 
the mutual subsumption of technique within their respective activities. MIT historian David 
Noble tells the history of their eventual marriage by noting how in the late 19th and early 20th 
century, the university institution and the capitalist organization were joining forces with 
increasing frequency. Scientific discoveries became an indispensable part of a corporation’s 
development through the patenting of new inventions which were essentially means of achieving 
monopolies in new markets that arose out of technological progress. Noble showed how this 
process was normalized over time as technical schools became more popular and in demand in 
the United States. The classical university, still grounded on old bourgeois notions of education 
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(in effect the institutional end legitimating its activity and transcending its practice), gradually 
incorporated this approach of prioritizing the development of scientific techniques so that 
education could better serve to ends of industry and the people working in it95. This shift in 
institutional motivations and activities took force in large part due to the need of engineers in 
management roles, who could apply their technical knowledge to increase the efficiency of not 
just the social groups - labourers and technicians - on the factory floor but to the structure of the 
organization more generally. In other words, as capitalist interests obviously served to gain much 
more from the association than science, scientific practices themselves came to be absorbed 
within productive ends, first for its development of new production techniques and latently 
evolving into the rationalization of the relation of production as such. This tendency was echoed 
in the growing view of the possibility to generalize engineering know-how to other fields of 
knowledge. As William Wickenden, a turn of the century MIT educator and industry man who 
greatly contributed to the expansion of engineering curriculums into the social sciences, reported 
in a 1929 study on engineering education, “Engineering will include in its tools any and all 
sciences as they become exact enough to yield economically predictable results”. As Noble 
himself concluded on these matters, “the corporate engineers of science-based industry had taken 
for their task the production of a world”96. 
 So the merging of science and technological innovation into technoscience reflected the 
increasing rationalization of the processes of production inherent to the management ethos of 
contemporary western societies. The expansion of automation within productive forces coupled 
with the increasing demand for skilled and specialized work maintaining the very machines 
obsolescing unskilled labour reflect Freitag’s general sentiment that a society grounded on the 
consumption of information and communication has essentially replaced one based mainly on 
the production of physical energy while only aggravating, in its own way, the problems of the 
latter. In a consumption based service economy, the asymmetrical relation between the worker 
and the machine has largely been replaced by what is arguably an even more disproportionate, 
though seemingly normalized, relation to the computer as the positive node of a henceforth 
globalized communication system. As we shall see, information and communications 
                                               
95 Noble, D.F. (1977) America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf. 
96 Ibid., p.320. 
 42 
technologies constitute important transformations not just to technique, but to the entirety of the 
mediations typifying the symbolic dimension of reality. 
 The 19th century industrial capitalist worker was practically integrated into the process of 
production through the machine. As Marx famously argued, the workers’ subjugation to the 
machine unfurled the objectifying capacity of their labour. Such was the nature of their 
alienation with regards to their product, their activity, their fellow workers, and their species-
being, forestalling the possibility of defining their activity in relation to a larger world, and thus 
their place within that world. One cannot say that they are baking a cake if the brunt of the 
activity involves pushing buttons and performing repetitive manual tasks within an otherwise 
fully automated cake-baking process. We have already shown how in this situation, the technical 
moment of action became autonomous to the extent that the activity was strictly productive and 
instrumentalised, yet was still generally reconciled within subjective synthesis of human activity 
given its grounding in the transcendental end of progress. In this light, we would argue that what 
was alienating from the position of the labourer was the severance from his or her expression in 
the end of the product, and therefore the transcendental end in a sense crystallized within it. The 
wage merely infers the possibility of accessing the means of subsistance within relations of 
capitalism, and one could at least infer that, from the perspective of the proletariat, it was likely 
the truer or more immediate end of the activity hence instrumentalised. Nonetheless, it doubles 
up the notion of the labourer’s subjection by highlighting its abhorrent necessity.  
 As Freitag rightfully notes, the culmination of this subjection to the industrial mechanism 
arguably reached its apex with Taylorism and its “piecemeal work” production model. However, 
this labour can conceivably be accomplished independently of the relation - be it one of 
enthusiasm, submission, or defiance - to the authority on which one depends to situate 
themselves as a worker in a production line and the possible meaning one can derive from the 
work. In other important research, Noble documented how Taylor’s motivations behind scientific 
management was an attempt to put an end to “considerable shop floor struggle” which he called 
“soldiering”. He writes, 
 
“Workers paced themselves for many reasons: to keep some time for themselves, to 
avoid exhaustion, to exercise authority over their work, […] to stretch out available 
work for fear of layoffs, and, last but not least, to express their solidarity and their 
hostility to management. Coupled with collective cooperation with their fellows on the 
floor  […] and labour-prescribed norms of behaviour, the chief vehicle available to 
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machinists for achieving shop floor control over production was their manual control 
over their machine tools they used to make metal parts97”. 
 
The exteriority granting the existential space for a relative self-determination enacted by the 
worker’s relationship of dependence towards the authority of the employer - again, be it 
antagonistic, enthusiastic, or submissive - tended to diminish or be completely removed in 
activity when computer automation came to the shop floor; the computer and the new operational 
methods that followed were not only aimed at better controlling the machines of the production 
line, but also the operators of the machines. “Everything and everyone, after all” Noble notes, 
“could be viewed as a part (“component”) related to other parts in a large whole (“system”)98”.  
 While the particularities and dynamics of the industrial shop floors differ in many 
important ways from the post-industrial service economy, their respective integrations to 
technology are legitimated on the same ideology of increased management and control of 
operations. A large majority of work in the service economy requires some form of 
communication, or expression and interpretation, and it is these activities that tend to be directly 
integrated into the system of information both within and between various organizations. So 
rather than be alienated from one’s labour against the authority of an employer on which one 
fundamentally depends, the subject’s engagement is immediately required within the system 
given that the nature of the work demands his or her subjective participation because, as Freitag 
notes, the act of expression and therefore communication into the world and towards others is the 
most basic form of sociality, and more generally engagement with that world; in a way 
subjectivity tends towards its own self-alienation99. The execution of the work depends much 
more on the individual’s direct engagement with his or her productive role given that the 
constraints need to be interiorized. As information flows from one end to the other, the subject is 
relegated to the being of an input and output of information, where the site of treatment of the 
information itself - i.e the subject integrated within the system - is ‘black boxed’ given that the 
inner workings of the subject’s mind can obviously not be fully integrated into the operable 
commands of the system’s mechanisms100.  
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 This is progressively the case as the conceptualization of social relations and their actors as 
mere variables within an overarching system of information is rendered effective within not just 
the context of organizations, but the greater society as a whole. For Freitag, the scope of 
(postmodern) organizational life generally encapsulates “civil society” and the public life of 
individuals. Whatever escapes it falls into the domain of private life, which for many ends up 
progressively reduced to the world of consumption, communication, and media culture101. 
However, many have argued that these domains of living are particularly susceptible to 
colonization by contemporary information and communication technologies. It is in fact no 
exaggeration to say that the products of technoscience, above and beyond producing new 
knowledge, essentially produce a new world. As Freitag puts it,  
 
“En effet, c’est à l’ensemble de cette production technoscientifique et surtout à son 
incessant développement, plutôt qu’à la “nature” ou à la “culture”, que la vie humaine 
est désormais confrontée existentiellement de manière croissante102.” 
 
Our environment tends towards the objects of its own productions and interventions; and it is 
precisely an environment that we contend with in how we from then on frame our surroundings, 
rather than nature or a world, as the latter by default do not result from human production. Given 
the propensity of the intervening practices towards operability, the possibility of conceiving 
society as a system of information is not just an epistemic frame of reference, but tends towards 
its realization in the technocratic (as in the technical operation and control of social life and its 
dynamics) digital information infrastructure.  
 On may object that despite their proliferation, these products of technique nonetheless 
maintain universal reference to a transcendental subject securing his or her personal and general 
liberty through progress, and that the technical moment of each expression is meaningful given 
the ideal conceived and contained in its end. However, we have seen how the activities of 
technoscience fall back on the virtual calculability and measure of an object’s operations. So 
what of technique in the contemporary age of information? What of the subject increasingly 
mediated and dependent on technologies in contemporary life? When technoscientific practices 
and the worldview behind them are extended to the whole of society - when the whole is 
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conceived, rationalized, and operated on as a system - technique tends to fall back on itself, and 
both the synthetic unity of subjects and the reference to a unified collective fade when the 





























IV. FROM SOCIETY TO SYSTEM 
 
So far, we have unfolded the history of the becoming of technique within what Freitag calls the 
synthetic unity of subjectivity. This culminated in revealing technique’s formal autonomy as a 
distinct moment of action within modern industrial production, itself appearing within a 
continuous historical process of the symbolic differentiation of social activity. We saw that 
despite its relative autonomy, technique in this context was still generative of meaning; still 
manifest of a socio-historic human activity in so far as it was instrumentalised towards advancing 
progress and the subject’s transcendental liberty. Furthermore, we’ve seen that the progressive 
development of science echoed a similar movement of autonomisation in the cognitive moment 
of subjective synthesis itself reconciled in the transcendental Truth of the world. As announced 
by Kuhn’s theory of ‘normal science’, the scaffolding of science’s theoretical supremacy within 
modern epistemology eventually gave way to its subsumption within technique as it became 
rationalized into its operability, giving birth to what many have dubbed technoscience. Having 
been preceded by the marriage of science and industry in the ongoing proliferation of capitalism 
in the late 19th and early 20th century, the historical arrival of technoscience was in a sense 
conjoined with the systemic operability of cybernetics, given the latter’s emphasis on 
communication and control.  
 Nonetheless, at this point we ask ourselves: How is an emphasis on control any different 
from any other relation of domination in history? How does control differ from power? We’ve 
already seen how the synthetic unity of the symbolic subject involves not only a reference to the 
group or community, but also to the inherent unity of that collective. Sociologically speaking, in 
traditional societies this virtual unity was established in reflection to a “beyond” maintained 
within narrative. Against the immediate sanction of the world, the projection of the sacred 
beyond it was channeled in a common will manifested through an obligation of obedience to a 
force of domination (eg. royalty); the subject inhabited this normative relation but was not its 
master103. Otherwise stated, legitimacy rested not on the diffuse symbolic sanction inherent to 
immanence in nature and authority was condensed and personalized (or personified) above social 
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life and regulated according to a personal will channelling divinity104. In modernity, it was the 
reapropriation and interiorization of this transcendence within the individual that pushed it even 
further: The obligation of obedience to the will of divinities will transmute into the subject’s 
sovereign will legitimating the rights granted under law maintaining his intrinsic liberty. 
Structurally speaking, power is here less recognized through the personification of divine will, 
but from the will of individuals whose free capacity for action is legislatively maintained, 
encapsulated under the totality that we call society. Therefore, the recognition of government 
doesn’t simply rest on an effective capacity for domination, but epitomizes the concept of power 
as a legitimizing force unifying a collective through institutional representation. It is this 
dynamic that is profoundly altered through the technocratic management of social life within 
which the unity of society dissolves into its conceptualization as a system. We must understand 
the terms of this mutation if we are to seize its effects on the symbolic subject.   
 
 
IV.i Gears and Logic Gates: Laws and Operations  
 
 Mechanical images of society are nothing new. Otto Mayr, historian of engineering, 
demonstrated how technological artefacts can be telling of broader social or cultural currents in 
his analysis of the use of mechanical clock metaphors throughout late medieval and the early 
days of industrial continental Europe. The inner workings and mechanical properties of the 
clock, its use as an object, and the way in which it captured the imagination in art, philosophy, 
and the sciences in some ways pre-empted the authoritarian ideology of order (the metaphor of 
the clockwork state) in the continent105. The opening lines of Hobbes’ Leviathan are musings on 
the mechanical nature of automata in so far as the works of men in governance are simply the 
worldly imitation of the mechanical works of God operating within men106. That is not to say 
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that men were merely clockwork. Alain Supiot has remarked how, in conjuring religion, law, 
science, and technique through biological metaphors for the functioning of the society, Hobbes 
“expresses a normative [emphasis my own] imaginary that is still largely ours: that which 
represents the government of men on the model of the machine”107. It is precisely this dimension 
which requires our attention in generalizing contemporary modes of social organization. That the 
computer has replaced the clock as the figure of governance also characterizes the method of its 
function: it outlines the transition from government through power operating on laws (or norms) 
to governance through control operating on facts (or operations). If technoscience and its 
cybernetic principles were being employed in the context of industrial production, it should be 
no surprise that they are also being utilized in matters of governance. It is less surprising still that 
the already highly rationalized science of economics would pair well with the former’s theories 
of information and control.  
  However, it must be stated that it wasn’t until the “invention” of capitalism that the 
practices encapsulated under “the economy” differentiated themselves so neatly against other 
domains within society. Our discussion of technique already indicates the manner in which the 
differentiation of social activities and the objects defined therein unfold in a contingent manner. 
The appearance of civil society as a distinct economic sphere - encapsulating the free exercise of 
the right to private property - required the mobilization of a bourgeois class and their practical 
exercising of a political liberty (which for all intents and purposes was still restricted to their 
benefit) against the old patrimonial guard in the consecration of a liberal political order108. As 
Freitag noted, this instigated a shift in the manner of reflecting on matters of legitimacy of the 
social order, which would eventually be reconceptualized into the intrinsic rationality of the 
market. Thus was born the science of political economics from the somewhat fictitious liberal 
dualism between the state and civil society represented through the mechanism of the market. 
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Rival techniques emerged from this: Against the mathematical calculations of economics 
through the use of pricing as a primary mechanism for evaluating the dynamic changes of the 
market, the state rendered legitimate statistical procedures of aggregation owing to the idea that 
only they are in a position to manifest the ‘common will’ that cannot find expression in the 
market109. Stated otherwise, at stake was the manner in which scientific practices could best infer 
the norms expressing the collective will of civil society110. While scientific knowledge was at the 
forefront of both state and the market, it was really in the statistical methods of the state that a 
synthetic view of humanity was maintained. Aggregation implies the synthesis of multiple 
measures of data as a means to succinctly encapsulate a large amount of observation so that 
hypotheses can be at once more precise and more encompassing, and therefore more 
representative of the social phenomena they study. The normative regulative aspect of civil 
society was not in itself under question, but it was nonetheless in tension with the liberty of the 
individual. Individuals have their own interests in mind, which the market must govern, but also 
develop attachments and organize into particular groups evincing norms which the market cannot 
seize and the state must therefore embody. Nonetheless, the gap between this statistical 
representation and the reality of the situation not only served as justification for the 
individualistic orientation of the market and the calculative rationality it inspired. With new 
modes of calculation came new imaginaries surrounding government paralleled by new 
conceptions of subjectivity. Within the context of economic liberalism, political opposition rests 
on disagreement over whether the state or the market should assume the major charge of 
regulating social life. However, this arguably artificial liberal dualism is no longer able to shine a 
light on the essential nature of social intervention and regulation since the vertical relation of 
power between these representations of civil society and what social life actually constitutes 
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flatten under the epistemic understanding of society as a system. The invisible hand that guides 
the rational economic subject gives way to the auto-regulated adaptive subject of the market.  
 In effect, the premise that there is no fundamental difference between a being’s process of 
environmental interaction and a market’s dynamism through the interaction of individual 
behaviours rests on the cybernetic ontologization of information, which would prove to be the 
key to rendering knowledge itself commensurable. According to Nobel prize winning economist 
(and avid cyberneticist) Friedrich Hayek, knowledge itself has no intrinsic form, and only 
acquires it through artifice. Social scientists (and socialists) ignore this fact and therefore also 
ignore the different kinds of ‘embodied and tacit’ knowledge that arise outside of their models. 
In other words, the ordering of social phenomena cannot objectively be accounted for in the 
independent actions of individuals and if “we define [them] in physical terms no such order is 
visible”111. If knowledge remains formless, the problem of constructing a “rational economic 
order” lies specifically in the fact that knowledge of what one needs exists solely in “dispersed 
bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge” possessed individually, or has Hayek 
puts it, “it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality” since 
the individual can never acquire the total knowledge that would allow him or her to act in a 
rational way112. The market must therefore be free to align itself with the forces and desires of 
individuals as only it can provide a calculable form or can embody indeterminate knowledge of 
society through its pricing mechanism; it alone is able to preserve the dynamic flow of different 
knowledges and therefore desires on the market. Otherwise stated, for Hayek the market is the 
manifestation of individual desires, and social order is the simple result of the evolution of 
behaviours adapting itself to growing complexity in order to stave off chaos.  
 Techniques of market analysis are by necessity of a numerical nature, since it is less 
important that they describe what something is as much as they be able to describe its interaction 
within the market itself. As Hayek himself put it, the value of the quantitative nature of scientific 
observation has less to do with precision and more to do with "substituting for a description in 
terms of sense qualities one in terms of elements which possess no attributes but these relations 
to each other"113. It is less about the technical or political surveilling of market forces as much as 
                                               
111 Hayek, F.A. (1942) Scientism and the study of society. Part I. Economica 9(35); p.288. Thus for Hayek the 
theories and statistical aggregations of the social merely impose a form on society from above.  
112 Hayek, F.A. (1945) The use of knowledge in society. NYUJL and Liberty; p.519-20. 
113 Scientism, p.275. 
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a societal adaptation to its logic as it manifests the totality of individual wills. To the extent that 
the market is a manifestation of collective knowledge ‘subjectified’ through calculation, new 
techniques of analysis become crucial in the inclusion of greater and greater market 
externalities114. In light of information’s universal commensurability, once the equation between 
knowledge and information is made, encapsulating the collective through market dynamics is 
simply a question of grasping as much information as possible. 
 
 
IV.ii Big Data, Small Government 
 
 At this stage we have all that can fall under the general umbrella of "Big Data” and social 
analytic techniques in full view. From the present perspective, both their use in contemporary 
society and the valuation of information they exacerbate not only shine a glaring light on the 
cybernetic genealogy of the ideas animating the enthusiasm behind these technical 
developments, but also demonstrates how the epistemological disappearance of society in favour 
of a system is intertwined with a peculiar praxis - its effective application both in technological 
development and the social behaviour that results from it. Indeed, the invention of the computer 
alone not only gave humanity the technical capacity to analyze social life through the individual 
interactions of each person, but bequeathed onto experts a view of social relations under its own 
terms. While the idea of social mapping existed prior to the technical capacity to see it through 
(Jacob Moreno came up with networked social mapping in the 1930s, while even the primitive 
version of contemporary computers didn’t arrive until at least a couple decades later115), 
calculating the multitude of individual interactions in any social setting started to become 
feasible once computing power started to factor into the equation, and like the perennial 
cybernetic feedback loop, the information it provided fed further theorization on the nature of the 
social relations it analyzed116. With social analytics then, the analysis of social phenomena and 
                                               
114 We will soon see how these externalities figuratively represent the noise within the self-regulating market 
mechanism; what is incommensurable with regards to its value is innumerable with regards to knowledge.  
115 Davies p.442-3. 
116 This in a sense gets at a fundamental distinction between a dialectical relation or schema and the idea of 
feedback. While the former enacts a potentiality that is at first negation, and then synthesis through re-appropriation 
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their theoretical facsimiles results from the play of mediations between individuals digitized into 
discrete information rather than a reflexive theoretical synthesis potentially aided by statistical 
aggregation. However, while the ability to calculate these links is of utmost importance, it is 
utterly useless if we do not have a means through which we can capture the necessary 
information117. This is why the increasing omnipresence of social media and internet platforms 
like Facebook or Google becomes crucial towards the technical realization of neoliberal 
governmentality as they are the site of data collection par excellence for the absorption and 
numeration of external factors to the knowledge we have of human action and daily life more 
generally.    
 So what is Big Data precisely? It rests on the idea that massive quantities of information 
can render the complete digitization of atomized social links possible through different analytic 
techniques, usually variations on machine-learning artificial intelligence. It is simply another 
way of saying that everything that is relevant to sociality can be rendered commensurable as a 
value, that all relevant knowledge can be given numerical form, not as representation from above 
(political), but horizontally insofar as market dynamics can match shifting individual desires 
through technological analysis and prediction. This process, as Rouvroy and Berns demonstrate 
so eloquently, is achieved in three steps performed in self-reference and therefore in a 
consolidated way: 
 First, data is harvested, gathered, and stored in massive quantities in the form of metadata 
by multiple entities for seemingly different ends. While governments collect data for purposes of 
security, control, and management of resources among others, private companies do so in order 
to increasingly personalize their marketing and advertising and improve their overall sales 
efficiency, while scientists gather it in the end of acquiring knowledge118. The storage of 
                                               
and renewal of the “original” state (double negation), the latter is coherent through its maintenance by an outside 
state that must necessarily be interpreted in its own terms; that is to say it is ontologically fixed. 
117 One of the many failures of project Cybersyn, an attempt to transcribe cybernetics principles into matters of 
governance in late 60’s Chile, was an essentially incompatible infrastructure. See Medina, E. (2011) Cybernetic 
revolutionaries : technology and politics in Allende's Chile. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
118 Antoinette Rouvroy and Thomas Berns. ‘Gouvernementalité algorithmique et perspectives d’émancipations’ in 
Réseaux 2013/1 no 177; p. VI. Furthermore, the process of data collection for social scientists has so profoundly 
expanded that it has essentially reframed more general questions regarding the development of new quantitative 
methodologies towards the manner in which to best make use of these new data gathering capabilities, as if nature of 
the knowledge that is acquired through these processes is overshadowed by the overwhelming capacity for big data 
to produce new knowledge. 
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metadata is automatic and in itself independent of any particular end or purpose. In its essence, 
metadata is decontextualized and therefore anonymous. On its own, it is therefore ‘harmless’ and 
‘morally objective’ insofar at it avoids any kind of individual subjectivity119. That is not to say 
however, that all data cannot be traced back to individuals. Both in content and form, the 
increasingly omnipresent capture of data sensors combined with the sophistication of mobile 
devices and wearable technologies evokes the possibility of tracking one’s every movements and 
correlating data from diverging sources to reconstruct context after the fact120. 
 The second step in the use of Big Data is the process known as datamining, where the 
stored data is treated in an automated process of calculating often extremely subtle correlations. 
The automated nature of this process means that it not only requires minimal human 
intervention, and is therefore not gathered or organized according to any pre-conceived idea 
which is either validated or refuted, but that the level of computation and the subtlety of the 
correlations extracted from the metadata occur on levels that defy human cognitive and sensual 
capabilities. This is essentially the manner in which machine-learning operates insofar as it 
‘learns’ to establish its own rules for manipulating and synthesizing data and therefore generates 
its own meta-hypotheses that are not grounded in reflection on the nature of anything in 
particular, be it market dynamics or human behaviour, but on a probabilistic prediction of the 
immediate future state of the totality of the data it used in its computation of the current data. 
This already preempts the third step; that of using these correlations in the creation of profiles for 
the actions of every individual within the network. The creation of steady-state predictions of the 
future state of the data (ontologically we are no longer referring to a “market” in the proper sense 
of the word) renders the totality more efficient through anticipation. The idea is that individual 
behaviours and the desires which animate them can be better served by an environment which, to 
the extent possible, can harmonize with these behaviours. Ideal-typically, the individual therefore 
enacts him or herself within the network, self-regulating themselves according to what the 
network can provide for them, and acts accordingly. Therefore, controlling for the environment 
could essentially boil down to controlling individual action121. This is the mechanical basis for 
algorithmic governmentality. 
                                               
119 Gouvernementalité algorithmique, p.VII. 
120 Andrejevic, M. (2018) ‘Framelessness or the Cultural Logic of Big Data’ in Mobile and Ubiquitous Media. New 
York: Peter Lang Publishing, p.252. 
121 Gouvernementalité Algorithmique, p.IX. 
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 On the one hand, it is clear that there is an essential commodification of information and 
the knowledge that can spring from it. This particular aspect can be more readily retrieved since 
it already animates the collective imaginary in mainstream critiques of contemporary 
informational capitalism. For starters, the business models of companies like Facebook and 
Google extract the majority of their tremendous profits from the reselling of user metadata to 
companies buying publicity space within the infrastructure of these ubiquitously popular 
websites (the maintenance and renewal of which is itself increasingly automated). It is no 
mystery how Facebook can be worth half a trillion dollars on the U.S stock exchange; for all 
intents and purposes, its business model is grounded on the single idea that the users are the 
product, and their attention is for sale122. Furthermore, given that users’ social activity feeds back 
into the way algorithms either modify themselves or lead programmers to modify the online 
infrastructure, this activity in turn provides “free labour” in so far as they further the optimization 
of these online spaces.  
 On the other hand, the celebration of Big Data conceals the more insidious nature of 
algorithmic governmentality: the fact that as a system mediating communication and 
continuously optimizing itself according to the explicit interests of individuals, the both 
conscious and unconscious capacity for individual action to reproduce society in thought and 
practice is slowly dwindled as the processes by which norms are both perpetuated and altered 
over time are extracted from the everyday and flattened with the information network. In other 
words, the way in which formless information is ontological to cybernetic epistemology is 
rendered effective and operable, increasingly and effectively removed from any situational 
(historical) contingency. Indeed, Marc Andrejevic’s assessment that “the goal of automation is to 
develop systems that replace societal decisions governing life, liberty, and opportunity” reflects a 
growing tendency towards relieving decision-making of human judgement entirely123. Whether it 
be the automatic generation of correlation and hypothesis in datamining, delegating this very 
process to other variants of artificial intelligence124, or filling the entire environment with sensors 
for more complete data capture, the expropriation of judgement is premised on the idea that the 
                                               
122 See Wu, T. (2016) The Attention Merchants: The Epic Scramble to Get Inside Our Heads. New York : Alfred A. 
Knopf 
123 Automatic Surveillance, p.12. 
124 See for example: Irpan, Alex. “Off-Policy Classification - A New Reinforcement Learning Model Selection 
Method.” Google AI Blog, June 19, 2019. https://ai.googleblog.com/2019/06/off-policy-classification-new.html. 
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cold objectivity of the machine is the most viable option towards fair governance. As we will see 































V. SUBJECTIVITY WITHIN THE SYSTEM 
 
 Given that the matrix of the symbolic lies within language, it seems conducive to begin this 
analysis by looking at the role of language in contemporary communication. We mentioned 
above how the most notable consequences of the cybernetic conceptualization of information 
were its universal commensurability and the essential ontological equivalence of the techniques 
whereby people exchange information and a mechanism controls another. This conception of 
human communication essentially culminates into a societal form characterizing a series of 
overlapping, self-referencing, compounding communication systems like those envisioned in the 
grand systems theory of Niklas Luhmann in the early 1980’s. In this image of society, there are 
only systems and subsystems referencing and sustaining each other in an autopoietic fashion 
constituting all levels of social reality. Its production and reproduction occurs simply as the 
operations of communication in its passage to and fro within different nodes in the information 
matrix. With this in mind, we may say that system’s theory is antithetical to Freitag’s theory of 
the symbolic; through his lens, a society of overlapping systems completely discounts any 
determined existence resulting from a historically contingent objectivation of the world. We will 
now explore the implications of a society conceived as a system for subjectivity through a look 
into its effects on language, action, and identity.  
 
 
V.i Reduction of Language to its Communicability 
 
  In the above image of the world, social reality itself is here the arbitrary coalescence of 
different operations contained within systems, and the symbolic dimension is completely 
flattened through its exchanging of signs behaviourally established into the subject through his or 
her engagement with the outside and other. For Gilles Gagné, a sociologist belonging to the same 
school of thought as Freitag, such a reduction of language within communication presents a very 
narrow view of social reality. The rise of communication “took the form of a generalization of 
the pragmatic attitude characteristic of American linguistics” and was later rendered possible 
through invention and democratization of its technical means: 
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“Celle-ci s’est vouée à l’étude du langage humain à des fins techniques et elle l’a 
compris comme le moyen de communication par excellence. “la séparation entre les 
corps des locuteurs [emphasis my own] et de l’auditeur - la discontinuité de leurs deux 
systèmes nerveux”, dit Bloomfield, est comblée par les ondes sonores dont la langue 
régle l’usage […] Toutes les théories pragmatiques qui travaillent ainsi selon le schéma 
personne-message-personne […] réduisent les langues à leur fonction 
communicationelle et considèrent comme une sorte de bruit [my emphasis] tout ce qui 
peut s’y trouver qui relèverait de la préconstruction cognitive d’un monde 
commun…”125 
 
The form and function of our modern communication traces the legacy of this purely functional  
(and logical-mathematical) treatment of language. It is the virtual significance of language itself, 
as a semiotic web of symbolic expression, softens under its informational treatment. Otherwise 
stated, the discrete analytical treatment of the world, from then on understood as the 
“environment”, in the effort to render it commensurable and therefore communicable as 
information, disavows and flattens the symbolic specificity of language on multiple fronts. 
 First, the signified, as the object of the linguistic signifier, is not the thing in itself in its raw 
disclosure to sense experience, but the idea or concept it figures. Recall that the concept 
originally emerges from the subject’s sensuous (empirical) interaction with an object elevated to 
an ideological relation from within the formal dialectics of the two poles (subject-
object/expressive-normative). It is therefore through the idea that we have of an object that we 
can figure its place within the universe of other objects. The concept is therefore not only what 
grants the object its specificity in its symbolic differentiation against other concepts within 
thought, but also its universality as concept in relation to other concepts within language126. 
However, this is fundamentally different than claiming that a language is universal (like 
mathematics for example); universal concepts with regards to language are not “languages” in 
the proper sense of the term used here but rather “codes” since they are of a 2nd order against the 
historical and contextual specificity of symbolic language all the while arising from those 
conditions127. This leads to another important feature of symbolic language in that the concept is 
a shared signifying representation of the object and necessarily transcends individual expression. 
                                               
125 Gagné, G. (2017) ‘Idéologie et communication. Problèmes contemporains de la discussion publique’. In 
Dagenais, D. (ED): La Liberté à l’épreuve de l’histoire. La critique du libéralisme chez Michel Freitag. Montréal: 
Liber; p.447.  
126 Dialectique et société, Vol. 1, p.160-2. 
127 Ibid. 
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Language being always a specific language, the concept emanates from the value and 
signification bestowed upon it within a particular shared context.  
 
“Ainsi, aucune signification ou idée ne m’est jamais irrémédiablement propre; même à 
 l’instant où je pense au plus profond de ma conscience individuelle, dans mon fort 
intérieur, elle n’est pas mienne, elle est nôtre. Chaque idée ou concept est une catégorie 
de la pensée commune…128”. 
 
The virtual universality of language is therefore premised on the common reference to a world 
that is co-inhabited. While it may seem self-evident to anyone that words, concepts, and for that 
matter actions are never made sense of in a vacuum, it is less obvious to avow their 
transcendental nature with regards to consciousness. It is precisely this symbolic specificity of 
language, its very essence and unity within the subject, that is ignored in the reduction of 
language to its communicational function. If communication is nothing other than the exchange 
of information between two points in a larger system, and social reality is increasingly 
effectuated and productive based on this idea, then society, in the unity of its whole, tends to be 
reduced to the kaleidoscope of self-referencing information networks on which our day to day 
communications are progressively established: equating social reality, both nature and society in 
its whole, to that of the network just described entails the subsuming of all other ‘symbiotic 
systems’ that characterize the world and outline the horizon of our cognition to the production of 
value in the exchange of signs within the matrix of communication129. Objectivation takes place 
insofar as it can be referenced within a framework of communication, that is to say - reduced to 
its information, and the meaning (social reproduction) of the world is progressively dependent on 
its legitimation within the process of communication itself. In other words, when language is 
reduced to its communicational function, the “virtuality" of symbolic reality that transcends the 
realm of “operable language” within communication (that which is incommensurate to the value 
form of information) and that is beyond the mere exchange of signs between people but 
nonetheless within the realm of a phenomenological account of reality (through the symbolic 
significance they acquire within language), is relegated to the status of a system in apparent 
                                               
128Dialectique et société, Vol. 1, p.163. 
129 Gagné, Idéologie et communication, p.447.   
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symbiosis with other systems (social processes), but nonetheless ontologically outside of 
them130. What is known can be controlled, and what cannot be controlled does not exist.  
  The reader will be reminded that this epistemological reduction in language merely reflects 
ideological tendencies emanating from the marriage of scientific research and economic 
motivations within technocratic governance, and from the perspective of common sense there 
may be little doubt that our tacit understanding of these forms of communication as applying to 
the conceptualization and description of a natural environment that is posited is practically 2nd 
nature. The problem lies in the reification of an ideological construction of language that in a 
sense confesses a way of being in which the operability of speech tends towards the absolving of 
its ontological essence in the very production of society. The meaning of every moment is 
universalized within the concept’s necessary distance from the object, and it is generally 
understood that the details, in the absolute objective fidelity of the object but also essentially of 
one’s existential experience of it - exceed one’s ability to express them precisely, no matter the 
technical prowess at one’s disposal131. Although this speaks to language’s immeasurable 
complexity, it is its fundamental immeasurability that is disavowed in the assessment that the 
mediation of the social is reducible to the communication of information; meaning arises only by 
virtue of being communicated, of being integrated within the circuits of information comprising 
the apparent totality of human connection. Symbolically, it is the diminishing of language’s 
universal quality, and thus the equal dwindling of virtual potentialities of expression in speech. If 
all thought, all speech (parole), and all action within the symbolic is virtually structured through 
language, then the inherent meaning contained within its lexicon, in the semiotic specificity of 
the given language’s matrix, tends to be confounded with - if not reduced to - its function132. 
                                               
130 Structurally, it doubles down on the black box metaphor mentioned above.  
131 Again we see parallels to Kant, in which then noumenon, the thing-in-itself, is inherently inaccessible.  
132 This formulation is somewhat reminiscent of Anton Zijderveld’s study of the cultural use of clichés. Stemming 
from “early industrial technique”, the phenomenon of the cliché originally referred to a “rational procedure to 
quickly and massively reproduce cultural material”. Keeping in mind the linguistic connotation of the argument, he 
claimed that the specificity of the cliché was in its overriding of meaning by its function, as it failed to positively 
“contribute meaning to social interactions and communication, it does function socially, since it manages to 
stimulate behaviour (cognition, emotion, volition, action), while it avoids reflection on meanings”. While 
Zijderveld’s definition applies strictly to the phenomenon of clichés, it eerily recalls certain tendencies within text-
based communication, not to mention the use of “emojis” as ideographic representations of different emotions. A 
word can be completely reduced to its functional aspect in that its singular self-contained meaning - what the word 
means in itself flowing from the history of its use - becomes secondary, if not arbitrary, against the information it 
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While this reduction is often intuitively avowed in the slough of embodied signs that are lost in 
text based communications (itself a further reduction of audio communications which allow for 
inflection in speech), but common sense can only carry one so far, and merely passes over the 
mutation at work in the symbolic relation to a language in its ontologization as the information 
within communication between nodes of interpretation. In Andrejevic’s words, “This is the 
promise of machine language, which differs from human language precisely because it is non-
representational and therefore collapses the space between saying and doing133.”Although he was 
specifically referring to the automation within machines that this treatment of language enables 
(we will return to this), it nonetheless sums up the manner in which the functional reduction of 
language legitimated on the commensurability of information across different mediums 
showcases the dialectical relation of adaptation that is in a sense being drawn here; humans 
created machines in their likeness, and now they are adapting to that very likeness. 
 
 
V.ii Reduction of Action to its Operability 
 
 For Freitag, the difference between symbolic and computer languages exist in their genesis 
and in the manner of their appropriation; the first is synthetic and expressive - and we have 
already alluded to the other being analytical and instrumental - the computer software is utilized 
rather than interpreted134. Tackling this difference from the perspective of the producers, of the 
propagators of either form will clarify the effects of modern communication on action itself. The 
author is engaged in channeling his or her expression through the production of a work itself 
objectivized within the aesthetic perception of the writer; the work itself, as well as its reception, 
are contingent upon a relative though still common literary and cultural universal with the reader. 
From this contingency rises the possibility of its communicability, but also that of sense or the 
meaning granting the expression intelligibility beyond the author as the source of the expression, 
and thereby in a sense giving the work a certain autonomy with regards to its symbolic form 
while also granting the author an immanent identity. The work itself is refashioned when it is 
                                               
carries and the resources (time and effort) saved in its articulation. See Zijderveld, A. (1979) On Clichés: the 
supersedure of meaning by function. Boston : Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
133 Automatic Surveillance, p.12. 
134 La nature de la technique, p.396. 
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read; every interpretation acts on both the reader’s existential space with regards to the virtuality 
of the self-contained (as in the objective representation of writing, the form of its empirical 
existence in story-telling, parable, poetry, and therefore in society, the world as symbolic 
virtuality) yet always-already open narratives of written language, but also the virtual 
representation of ideas which themselves alter the significance of the concept as signified 
representative of the object (is it tragic, revolutionary, original, derivative?…). 
 The programmer is an author insofar as the code expresses the derivation of multiple steps 
and tasks arriving at a desired end, and like the writer this end is earmarked with the subjectivity 
of its creator, the qualities of the code itself being open to judgement based on the degree of its 
functional and - relatively speaking - aesthetic elegance. However, derivations in analytical logic 
are simply qualified by their being correct or incorrect, and any value judgement on its efficiency 
cannot refer to anything beyond its function, ie its expression never transcends its function. Like 
the written narrative, the computer program is also relatively self-contained yet exceeded by a 
world which defines it (because it is a product of human practice), but this openness merely 
derives from the possibility of its analytical effectiveness with regards to the end(s) sought 
within the set (the structural parameters of the language) from which it emerges, since it is 
inherently operational, and the specific organization of the set is only generalizable to the extent 
that the user tinkers with the functionality of the program itself135. However, under the normal 
circumstances emblematic of its intended operation (its application), the user is simply utilizing 
the program towards a pre-defined end; nothing speaks through it beyond the operational intent 
of the programmer within the physical capacity of the object and the structural conditions under 
which the program was written towards a particular end; nothing essentially exceeds it.  
 Whatever expressive qualities emerge from it come from its subordination to the procedure 
rather than to an interpretation which is constantly under tension within symbolic (re)production. 
In a sense, it is as if the user was effaced in his or her interaction with the machine. On this 
Freitag is clear: 
 
                                               
135 This qualitative difference between symbolic language and the computer program is more obvious on a larger 
time scale; That the significance of a word - the signifiyng concepts linked to it - can change over times is as 
obvious as the fact that 2+2 will always be equal to 4.  
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“Pour ceux qui sont ‘devant la machine’ et donc de l’autre côté de sa conception, ce qui 
était auparavant un cheminement empirique dans une recherche synthétique de sens, un 
sens chaque fois confronté par eux à la transformation du réel et continuellement réajusté 
en fonction de cette expérience objective au fur et à mesure que l’action progresse vers 
la fin qu’elle s’était donnée, cela se réduit maintenant à l’application correcte d’une 
procédure, et le résultat est pour eux le résultat de la procédure, non le leur136.” 
 
So the capacity of the user to “transform the actual” is essentially usurped by the empirical 
operations of the program, its perceived meaning necessarily falling back on its function, since 
the program itself can only refer to the end of its immediate operation with no effective 
possibility of accessing the empirical or symbolic significance transcending it in its utility. The 
sense experience resulting from the ceaseless tension between the idealization of an act against 
its empirical determination, and the meaning synthesized within the function (re)producing the 
conditions of its renewal and its possible expansion within the subject’s field of intelligibility, is 
collapsed into the singularity of the program’s predefined end.  
 We can clarify this last statement by means of an example of when human beings acquire 
new skills. When someone first picks up a musical instrument, a mess of new movements, 
behaviours, techniques, and ways of being confront the aspiring musician (if he or she should of 
course not be discouraged) down to the very way in which the instrument is held, the best way to 
manipulate it, etc. The mechanical aspects are promoted in practice - themselves deriving from 
an entire history of grounded knowledge and traditions - to congeal these initially awkward, 
uncomfortable movements and gestures into habits and eventually into reflexes, becoming part 
of the musician’s way of being-in-the-world. These increasingly automatic “2nd-nature137” 
actions extend the field of intelligibility in the subject since the means of expression native to the 
                                               
136 La nature de la technique, p.396. 
137 Recall that this general process can be understood as the symbolic extension of an evolutionary process that is 
formally compatible with the view of subjectivity adopted throughout this work. There are various biological 
processes that over immeasurable periods of time crystallize into habits and then into reflexes as part of any 
organism’s continuous interaction with the world in which it dwells. As we have already seen, this process is a result 
of adaptive necessity just as much as that of a relative freedom the organism entertains with its milieu (umwelt), both 
contributing to the essence of whatever it is - it is essentially the condition of its expression. With the increasing 
autonomy of these embodied processes (in its more advanced stage what we call organs), the world is disclosed to 
the organism in a way that is specific to its kind and thus constitutes the very totality of its sense experience, 
including awareness if not of itself, then of its relation to other organisms, including the recognition of its own. In 
that sense, and with regards to the anchoring of the symbolic within and above this biological contingency, what we 
call 2nd-nature could on another plane be conceptualized as a disavowal in the properly positive psychoanalytic 
sense (refoulement). 
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instrument’s theoretical (symbolic) and mechanical functions are exponentially enlarged through 
the subject’s increasing capacities. In other words, the instruments’ “causes” (aitia… its 
rationality) align with the mechanical practices and the virtualized intentions of the aspiring 
musician, and this alignment is dynamic and contingent through a variety of factors such as the 
progression of their skill, their investment in the art, etc. In other words, the practices that went 
into the instrument’s crafting are co-enabling the skills for which it was conceived and the 
expressive intent that justifies and gives meaning to the practice138.  
 So fixed or established behaviours in our bodies open up the scope of human experience in 
symbolic activity, granting consciousness its existential reach into an ‘objectively’ greater 
horizon of phenomena in establishing the new conditions of the immediate present and thus a 
world139. But - like our physiological and metabolic processes - while the experience human 
beings acquire stand anywhere between the potential and the necessity of their enlargement 
coinciding in the existential field of the same subject, the embedding of technological automation 
of the sort described within action essentially involves its enlargement outside the subject of 
symbolic conscience, outside of space and time, which collapse on themselves in its receding 
from symbolic disclosure. As Freitag surmises, 
 
“Ce qui disparait, c’est l’engagement existentiel du sujet dans l’acte, sa conscience 
sensible et symbolique ou culturelle, qui se trouve reportée en dehors de cette 
processualité extériorisée et maîtrisée, ou contrôlée140.” 
 
Alas, it is not that the actions or processes in which a computer program is inserted are on the 
whole devoid of meaning, since they are still for the moment contained within a larger universe 
of human practices. But the program - in its self-referential exercise - becomes black boxed 
within the ongoing process of development in which these practices not only renew their 
                                               
138 It is in this manner that we can view an object as “extension”; it grants the subject a voice beyond the organic 
field of his or her body, the same way a simple tool enables whatever purpose it was intended toward. Furthermore, 
it must be stressed how these poles between action resulting from unified symbolic expression and the computer 
program are extremes, as a relative level of alienation from an object can yet be tolerable and conducive to 
expression in action (it also signals the fundamental distinction between a tool and a machine) . In any case, the 
extension also contrasts an idea of authentic ‘communication’, as opposed to the person-message-person 
communication of the informational subject. 
139 One can readily see this by consciously focusing on their breathing while being mentally engaged in other 
activities… 
140 La nature de la technique, p.391. 
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meaning, but are always pregnant with the potential to catalyze the expansion of the subject’s 
symbolic field of intelligibility, which remains the formal synthesis of the different moments of 
action unified within the subject. If we take a bird’s eye view and conceive of these black 
boxes141 in a generalized manner as a means to regulate human practice, they collapse the 
conditions of their functioning and merely retain the intentions reified in their ends for which 
they were produced (to the extent that the technology works as intended). In this case, they 
ultimately - in form and function - refer to a manner of being that, as we have seen, reverts to the 
inherent operability of a function as a means of control in the problem solving of circumstantial 
objectives estranged from an idealized end transcending the empirical and intentional aspects of 
practice. This relation is furthermore doubled down when elevated to another degree, that is to 
say when these programs are themselves the result of other algorithms generating more efficient 
interpretive states of the system, then the program’s self-referential essence is repeated on a 
higher level of production alienated from the actions of actors with the system. The expressive 
and normative poles of synthesis collapse in uroboric forms of self-reference outside of space 
and time, immediately operable according to the formal logic of the machine (effectively 
performing a reification Luhmann’s vision of the social system). The growing effects of 
generalized technological intervention within the fabric of social life therefore essentially 
doubles down on the ideological consequences of the reduction of language to its 
communication: It is not just space and time that collapse in the phenomenological mediation of 
the machine, but the reflexive expansion of the existential field of intelligibility within the 
subject that tends to be curtailed.  
 The point of the above comparison is not about revealing some inherent “dark side” within 
the operability of action. However, it does showcase the manner in which the collapse of 
normativity at the structural (systemic) level curtails the symbolic reach of action 
phenomenologically. While the utilitarian philosophy of value and interest underscoring the 
invisible hand was itself plagued with its own myopic views of society, it still managed to 
present a view of human action grounded on the free choice of individuals, albeit one that was 
reducible to a calculation. With the information marketplace, symbols, concepts, and ideas are 
not valued simply through their being contested, celebrated, negotiated, in short: acted on by the 
                                               
141 With respect to the argument being made, back holes would see to be a more effective analogy… 
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collectivity engaged in their social reproduction according to the manner of their being-with-
others. The process is rather increasingly occurring within a modern communicational 
infrastructure that sets the terms for the market in a manner that is devoid on any transcendent 
principle beyond the code; the function of the program itself is itself surpassed by a new function 
in reaction to correlations which are increasingly black boxed to the programmers themselves. 
Simply put, if algorithms have a cause in what gets “air time”, who “goes viral”, and how the 
network literally ‘produces’ communication142, then the Hayekian market-as-subject is in a sense 
realized in the models that are projected onto the network. In this scenario, action 
(communication) operates on action, the shaping of which is fundamentally divorced from its 
source within the subject, always auto-referencing, enhancing, the self-correcting capacity of a 
system incessantly vectored towards its greater efficiency.  
 If technique is seized as instrumental within action through the act of production in which 
it reveals itself being bound to an idealized end, then how should we qualify productive activity 
within a network of communication? In other words, how does it speak to the ends of one’s 
actions? We’ve already mentioned how communication itself becomes an act of labour; it is the 
productive capacity of the medium enabling the reproduction of the network while 
simultaneously capturing the functioning of its black boxed143 “non-digital relays” i.e people144. 
Furthermore, the product of labour - the information resulting from action on the network, is 
completely arbitrary and generalized in relation to not only the intention behind the 
communication, but the act of communication itself. As Freitag notes, information in this case is 
not just raw material, but the end product as well. Information is used to produce information in 
the name of information on a network of information; in Aristotelian terms it is at once the 
formal, material, final, and efficient cause145. Accordingly, since the technical moment of action 
must be reconciled in an end that transcends it (recall that instrumentality in its specificity entails 
                                               
142 “The medium is the message”… 
143 One may have noticed the integration the black box image from both the perspective of the subject and the 
perspective of the system. In the former, the operations of the system implode the reflexive process of knowledge 
acquisition in the symbolic. In the system, it is the reduction of the subject to a node of uncertainty which itself 
presents a problem of commensurability with the network.  
144 Such is the case with SEO (search engine optimization) techniques in web design. Take the example of Kialo, a 
new variation on the social media platform which organizes debate according to the organization of different ideas 
within argument trees. The profitability of such a platform does not stem from a product that they sell, but from the 
increased organization and ordering of information that it provides to larger platforms on which the site is 
embedded.  
145 La nature de la technique, p.386. 
 66 
the differentiation of the means from the end as well as its formal indifference to the end), and 
that the end sought - consciously or unconsciously, intentionally or not - is the better efficiency 
and increased operability of the network, then instrumentality refers back to itself within the 
synthesis of the different moments, and the meaning of an activity becomes essentially 
intertwined with its function without exceeding it or going above and beyond it.  
 Given that the arithmetical infrastructures of the entire system adjust themselves through 
what is inputed, that these adjustments enact further inputs, and that this cycle regenerates the 
conditions of the production of value through its assimilation of prior production, it takes upon 
itself the terms of (re)production in a manner that is removed from the human action instigating 
its movement. The overlap of action on action in operation, rather than action according to the 
‘negotiation’ of the normative moment of symbolic synthesis is therefore essentially irreflexive. 
The singular action of the subject, removed from its inherent social reproductive capacity in as 
much as the efficiency of the act is extracted from its symbolic ontological unity, is equally 
removed from the reflexive necessity rooted within action because the network commandeers the 
negative and positive moments of the normative relation of the subject in the reproduction of 
“the social”, as it outlines both the limits of subjective operability and its opening within the 
network. The same is true when we approach this phenomenon via language, as the 
transcendental quality of concepts from which thought and action derive meaning necessarily 
implies a position of relative autonomy and reflexive distance absent within its computational 
processing. Otherwise stated, in cyberspace one is free to pursue, imagine, realize, satisfy, any 
and all curiosities, fantasies, and desires, but these are increasingly fulfilled according to a 
market logic that effectively (not just conceptually) appropriates the nature of social reproduction 
for itself146. 
 Therefore, the legitimacy of the market rests on the equation of this freedom of choice with 
the opening of communication and information on a planetary scale. But as has been evidenced 
throughout this work, this kind of technological determinism feeds back on itself when the 
notion of progress through technique, although still entrenched in the technical act as generative 
of meaning - refers to the operations of technique itself not as the means towards emancipation, 
but as its very condition. This fact is brought home with Freitag’s claim that the hallmark of the 
                                               
146 As we have seen, this logic is not grounded on the inherent rationality of the individual subject, but on the 
rationality (operability) of the market itself! 
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mode of regulation of postmodern technologically mediated societies is centred on the capacity 
for the immediate actualization of everything - “the common sense of pragmatism […] and auto-
referential systems”147. From a semantic standpoint, the technical condition of action is either 
completely recused (I don’t care how it works, just that it works!) or, as we have already 
observed, sits on itself as the main driver - as the “meaning” emanating directly from the 
function of action. Given that activity on the network increasingly produces the conditions of 
social relations, and that this entire process is integrated into the network’s operations, both the 
expressive and normative ends of subjective synthesis within thus disappear within its 
operability.   
 
 
V.iii Dissolution of Transcendental Identity 
 
 Having shown the manner in which contemporary communications and its digital 
infrastructure - legitimated on techno-scientific practices and neoliberal utilitarian dogma both 
conceptualized in their likeness to cybernetic epistemology - tend towards the reduction of 
language and action to their immediate operability within an information network, we are now in 
a better position to grasp these effects on subjectivity in its formal and existential unity with 
itself and with the world. As evidenced earlier, the ontological condition of the subject is 
necessarily one of alterity. It is constitutive - the mark of the human being’s necessary 
objectivation within the world, so that his or her inscription is not just what gives meaning to 
activity, but also what characterizes the conditions of identification with and within a larger 
whole in itself and with regards to exteriority, whether it be the world or nature. The argument 
here is therefore that in a system whose operations we have shown essentially cannot refer to 
anything beyond itself (autoréférentiel), and thus appropriates the other modes of expression 
proper to symbolic existence, alterity tends to dissolve in the confusion between the (empirical) 
world and its (reflexive) representation, and the only force substantiating the subject beyond his 
or her activity is an ideological reference to an idealized self absolutely free from all constraint. 
                                               
147 Identité transcendantale, p.127. 
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 Epistemologically, the contemporary dissolution of transcendence can on the whole be 
situated in line with a general process of ongoing rationalization (disenchantment, secularization, 
etc.). However, we are not claiming a progressive re-appropriation of an exteriorized 
transcendence which manifests the steady appeasement of myth, religion, and the 
disenchantment of the world. For Freitag, the opposite is rather the case: it is the world itself in 
its disclosure that is originally sacred in early societies; language is immanent to the world, and 
thus the entire world in a way speaks to and through subjects (la parole). 
 
“La sacré n’est donc pas transcendant, mais au contraire fondamentalement immanent au 
monde, selon le modèle d’une constante circulation entre le “caché” et le “manifeste”, et 
il est sans cesse fréquenté ou côtoyé dans la vie quotidienne où il surgit non d’en haut, 
mais de la profondeur même de l’être…148” 
 
As mentioned earlier, symbolic identity is originally contingent upon its exteriorization within 
the scope of a specific language that a priori defines the manner in which objects - virtual and 
empirical - are reflexively disclosed in their representation. Reflexivity implies elevation beyond 
the immediate rapport with the object in sense experience. It is in this manner that the manner of 
this relation transcends its sense-condition (meaning is not empirical). The introduction of gods, 
or more generally “the heavens” above and beyond the world “here below”, further exteriorized 
the manner in which the unity of the subject is maintained in relation to the whole now mirrored 
against the alterity of that which is beyond it. This unity is double: identity of self and for others 
(projection as alter ego in reflexive understanding) and the civilizational whole contained therein 
in the form of a generalized Other (Mead, Lacan). This reached its apex in modernity with the 
interiorizing of the transcendental unity of society - now objectified in its concept - within 
individuals. The political instance of reflection on society unifies the manner in which these 
transcendental a priori (unity of the self and the collective) were reconciled within the social 
differentiation of activity in modern institutions, but also relegates the world itself (“nature”) to 
its mere empirical reality, subject to human mastery. 
 Alas, the perversion of our relationship to nature is the clearest and most easily observable 
of these symbolic structural conditions within communication systems. The world loses its 
exteriority with regards to artifice: Ubiquitous computing - resulting from the ongoing 
                                               
148 Freitag, M. (2009) L’abîme de la liberté: Critique du libéralisme. Montréal: Liber; p.476. Emphasis my own. 
 69 
development and automation of technologies purposed to regulate social life within the general 
umbrella of algorithmic governmentality - exemplifies this well and manifests the extent to 
which the “living” environment is increasingly integrated into the information network, 
disintegrating the distinction between “nature” and “society” as either pole tends towards its 
disclosure as simply “interactive”. Interactivity becomes the manner in which the milieu is 
“alive”, purporting to be adaptive for the sake of convenience, when in fact the subject is 
adapting to that particular mode of disclosure. Phenomenologically, we can conceptualize this 
idea in a manner like Heidegger’s concept of Enframing to an information society149. The 
German philosopher famously argued that modern technology (and indeed, it was the industrial 
machine that he conceptualized) is ‘a mode of revealing’, of disclosure in the sense of aletheia. 
This revealing takes the form of a challenge that is placed upon nature - “the unreasonable 
demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such150”. Through its 
mechanisms of unlocking, transforming, and distributing nature's energy and thus regulating and 
securing it, modern technology's revealing becomes incessant, or fixed in its presence, and it 
demands of its object to be 'on call' for continued exploitation of its resources, which Heidegger 
refers to as "standing reserve". That challenge which orders the revelation of Being as standing-
reserve is what Heidegger calls "Enframing"; it is the course whereby technology reifies itself as 
the lens through which the world can be observed and inhabited. This is essentially analog to the 
manner in which the equation of language to its communicational function effectively reduces 
the complexities of social life to the overlay of messages being exchanged. But over and above 
                                               
149 In the end, Heidegger presented an account of the becoming of technique by investing the ontological reach of 
disclosure (aletheia) within it and thus bypassing its specificity within action. From the perspective of critique, 
Heidegger extended the entire weight of such analyses on the historical unfolding of the metaphysics of science, and 
as such his account practically ignores the dialectics involved in technique’s unfolding - and therefore its ontological 
specificity - in such a manner. Be that as it may, his phenomenology of Being-with technology ultimately describes 
rather well the manner in which the objectivity of the world is funnelled into a specific mode of revealing, which is 
here and now the processing of the environment into its treatment to specific functional ends integrated within the 
system, be they industrious, sustainable, aesthetic, etc. From the perspective being presented here, it is analog to the 
collapse of the subject into the object; in the words of Heisenberg, “everywhere men [sic] look, they see only 
themselves”. See Freitag, M. (2003) ‘De la Terreur au Meilleur des Mondes. Globalisation et américanisation du 
monde: vers un totalitarisme systémique’. In Dagenais, D. (Ed): Hannah Arendt, le totalitarisme et le monde 
contemporain. Québec. Presses de l’Université Laval. 
; p.355, footnote 3. Elsewhere, Freitag has noted how Heidegger presented the objective pole of technique’s hold on 
the subject, whereas Gehlen, in the ultimate discharge of human thought al-together through its technical 
appendages, represented its subjective end.  
150 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 14. 
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Enframing’s locking of nature into a single mode of disclosure - that of its availability for 
exploitation - it is, as noted above with Gagné, the reduction of society to its communication, the 
subsequent exclusion of all symbiotic non-communication based systems harmonizing with it, 
and ultimately the concurrent tendency to collapse any alterity with nature whatsoever as the 
latter is integrated into the system itself, only to be maintained in the imaginary through its 
fetishized objectification as a site of both “reconnection” and “unplugging”!  
 So the “entire objective horizon of experience” tends to turn into a virtual ‘world’ as “it 
falls into the grips of systemic regulation or integrates itself to it”151. But in an odd though 
suggestive play of words, we can conceptualize the other side of this phenomenological closing-
in within Enframing with the framelessness characterizing this digital capture of the world; the 
end of representation and its non-objective depiction of reality in its essential occluding of 
information. The more pervasive the data capture, the more accurate the operative model of an 
individual’s identity will be and the better the market mechanism will adjust to his or her 
distinctiveness. This process is “frameless” in that both the boundaries of information collection 
in terms of its cumulative capacity and the various “forms of representation we rely on to 
reproduce our reality for us” are no longer subject to limits152. To be sure, the confusion of 
individual identity proper with its representation has in a sense long been part of a modernized 
regulatory mechanism within the administrative function153. The radicality of contemporary 
communications stems less from this equation, but from the pretence that as the system widens 
its reach in its gluttony for more information, increased data capture will provide a more 
                                               
151 Totalitarisme Systémique translation my own, p.367. 
152 Andrejevic, M. (2018) Framelessness, op. cit. 
153 This is true even in practice. Kaufmann has reviewed the historically first conceptual uses of identity as 
identification in administrative efforts to regulate “the new society” emerging from the moors of tradition. 
Identification papers and later the identity card became an important function of the administrative mechanism. The 
ID card was legitimated on the premise of maintaining order and control over the governed body. Just as parish 
registers holding baptism records (handed over to administrative authorities at the end of the 18th century) were 
legitimated on the proper granting of ecclesiastical benefits, proper administration on behalf of the state involved the 
reduction of the complexities of real life into a few key characteristics embodied in print, constituting a ‘necessary’ 
lie for the administrative effort which, from its point of view, was the original and the represented body its double. 
This original function was avowedly instrumental, but despite its aim ultimately vectoring towards the liberties and 
rights of the embodied individual as such, it eventually came to be equated with his or her identity proper: Reading 
from the letter of French law, stating that “[T]out Français (…) ne peut justifier sont identité que par la production 
d’une carte d’identité”, Kaufmann highlights a “confusion inaugurale, aux lourdes conséquences. Toute la réalité 
d’une personne serait désormais censée pouvoir être concentrée en un seul papier, l’identité apparaissant ainsi 
comme une donnée extrêmement simple et contrôlable”. See Kaufmann, J-C. (2004) L’invention de soi: une théorie 
de l’identité. paris: Arman-Colin. 
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objective take of reality that bypasses representation altogether. When algorithmic 
governmentality enacts the mechanisms by which normativity itself collapses onto the real, the 
objective reference becomes the system itself whose functioning refers back to its incessant drive 
towards greater efficiency; representation - whether it be the narrative frame of knowledge or the 
virtual identification to a greater collective - is ideologically reduced to a control mechanism 
made legitimate through the striving for constraints that are immediately tailored to (immediately 
operable on) the individuality of the subject. The market promises to fulfill all individuals their 
proper share of value in their subjective planes that are essentially irreconcilable to the next; that 
is why echo chambers154 - the information “reality balloons” in which specific world-views are 
reinforced and amplified - are both functionally convenient with regards to the system; they both 
maintain a sense of subjective autonomy all the while keeping these spheres commensurable to 
each other from an economic or business perspective. However, this commensurability speaks 
only to its market valuation: From the reflexive production of meaning and its fecundity within 
the symbolic, these discrete realms are opaque to each other, segmented on the systemic capture 
of impulses and subjective patterns indicating identification with various fragmented interests 
and their associated products and/or groups. Moreover, given how information is tailored to 
these individual affinities under the banner of convenience, relevance, and catering to subjective 
taste, the mediated reference to a common world is slowly unraveled as the subjective references 
themselves are increasingly specialized and all-encompassing to the point of being irreconcilable 
with each other155. In other words, the world slowly loses the symbolic depth of its common 
objectivity, and the generalized Other as the unity of society contained within the individual is 
disintegrated only to be recomposed from the outside, within an amalgamation of many smaller 
“big Others” generally connected by arbitrary affiliations156.  
  A similar thing can be said of self-identity. For starters, pervasive data capture merely 
extends the reach157 of the hyper-rationalized re-appropriation of the symbolic economy of the 
subject - manifested in the increasing management of individuals “kept together” through the 
                                               
154 While filter bubbles are more specific in their definition as the narrowing of information received by subjects 
through the past online behaviour, the terms are essentially interchangeable for the point being made. 
155 In the words of John Lanchester, “Our conception of ‘we’ is becoming narrower”. See Lanchester, J. (2017). You 
Are the Product. London Review of Books, 39(16), 3-10. Retrieved from https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n16/john-
lanchester/you-are-the-product. 
156 Identité transcendentale, p.125-6. 
157 Increasing the frame until we can do away with it altogether. 
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interventions of experts in public as much as private life (to the extent that such a categorical 
distinction continues to make sense). Mobile apps and bodily sensors represent the latest tools 
for the neoliberal self-responsibilization of the individual’s physical and psychological well-
being, promoting habits and behaviours that help individuals “be themselves” against the slough 
of often contradictory demands they must meet. Stated otherwise, the subject is not adaptive in 
the sense of a virtuous malleability or flexibility, but rather must mold one’s self according to 
different situations through the injunction to embrace one’s “unique self”. Slavoj Zizek makes a 
similar point when he claims that extreme individualism inevitably reverts to its opposite, since 
this injunction to be oneself inevitably leads to permanent refashioning and radical uncertainty, 
with "no proper face”158. Identity is thus not so much multiple or fragmented across a plane of 
particular interests - as popular currents in contemporary sociology have either argued for or 
taken for granted - as much as adaptive to circumstance and accompanied by an ideological 
injunction to be enthusiastic in its embrace159. Since the ‘common sense’ of activity increasingly 
lies within its utility, knowledge is therefore increasingly reified through the accumulation of as 
many different ‘experiences’ as possible (The underside of information as currency). This is 
particularly true of self-knowledge, which in the absence of a transcendental referent sinks back 
into the reflexivity of the subject always trying - but never succeeding - to “overcome“ itself160. 
                                               
158 With the substantial difference that for Zizek, this is because what the mask “ultimately hides is nothing itself” 
whereas for Freitag, this “emptiness“ is specific to the contemporary mode of social reproduction as we have alluded 
to it throughout this analysis. Nonetheless, Zizek has long opposed the postmodern argument that we don’t have a 
fixed socio-symbolic identity, “adrift in a sea of inconsistent selves” where each part reveals a face of one’s 
personality; subjects are not necessarily more fragmented or dispersed than they were before. Rather, Zizek argues 
that the “symbolic fiction which confers a performative status on one level of my identity, determining which of my 
acts will display symbolic efficiency, is no longer operative”. See Zizek, S. (2008) The Ticklish subject: the absent 
center of political ontology. London: Verso.  
159 Sociologically speaking, this idea of an adaptive agent opens up a breadth of epistemological and 
methodological questions. Would it not suggest that the existence of the “classic" post-modern sociological lingo of 
identity as “fragmented”, “fluid”, “variable”, etc. as formal categories of the problem of identity are prescriptive, 
and thus are diverting attention away from the important kernel, to speak ironically, of what is actually taking place 
with regards to identity as such in the context of information society? Should the researcher’s toolbox not adapt to 
the new dimensions of social interaction? How do these new tools effect the nature of the questions pondered? In 
what ways do our current tools provide distorted views on the ontological reality of relatively new yet pervasive 
forms of communication? These questions signal the manner in which this thesis essentially flows along this line of 
inquiry. 
160 David Riesman provided an enlightening, if not somewhat crude, typology contrasting the modern and 
contemporary character types in his postwar sociological work “The Lonely Crowd”. While the modern “Inner-
directed” character was equally concerned with repute and keeping up with his peers in his everyday life, Riesman 
argues that what defines the contemporary “other-directed” individual is the internalization of this necessity to the 
point of keeping up with others in the quality of one’s inner experience; the moral compass is expanded to include 
 73 
This is not a continuous process of becoming in the “overcoming yet never succeeding” path of 
life, but an irresolvable conflict between complete transparency and openness, and an assertion 
of distinctiveness. Relative to oneself, the subject is therefore as Freitag puts it, “a bottomless 
well” that must be explored161.  
 The metaphysics of this disjunction within the unity of the subject and the ideological 
impetus towards framelessness are most egregious within virtual reality. But this is not the same 
virtuality as elaborated throughout this work. Here the symbolic virtuality contained within the 
concept in its phenomenality converges immediately with sense experience, collapsing every 
measure of necessary distance; nowhere is the concept more effectively collapsed into the real, 
action more immediately removed from its normative reproduction, and the unity of subjectivity 
more immediately dissolved into its operations. In a sense, the pretension of frameless 
objectivity combined with the manner in which the reach of action is appropriated signals the 
increasing integration of subjectivity itself within the system. The positive limitations of the 
world acquiesce to those of the system (under the pretence that the system has no inherent limits) 
within which the creative liberties of the subject flow in a psychotic fantasy. Idealization gives 
way to realization as absolute possibility; if something can be done, it should and it will be. The 
possible becomes the new horizon of a world unregulated by anything other than an aimless 
(generalized and arbitrary) desire for possibility as such, and to limit such freedoms beyond the 
operable parameters of the system constitutes an unnecessary constraint.  
 In opening his theoretical exposition of the expressive end of the dialectical moment of 
subjectivity, Freitag takes up the concept negatively by illustrating an idealized truly objective 
form of knowledge: 
 
“Une connaissance idéalement objective mettrait en oeuvre un système opératoire 
parfaitement autocontrôlé, produit exclusif d’un arbitraire opératoire désincarné, c’est-à-
dire du pur concept d’opérationnalité. Un tel système ne comporterait alors aucune 
détermination a priori, il ne subirait dans sa construction aucune contrainte, il serait le 
                                               
peer groups and broader social currents, rather than just the figures of one’s upbringing. On the surface, the other-
directed person seems much more relaxed and less prude than the inner-directed type. however, in the former’s 
exploitation of leisure, the self is seen as an object "whose upkeep [is] carefully maintained for resale purposes”; 
combined with the fact that popular culture becomes the training ground in group adjustment - popular culture that is 
equally the site of mass consumption - the lack of clear boundary between group adjustment and private interest, 
between work and play, and between production and consumption all culminate to the impossibility of escaping 
from one’s self because it isn’t clear what this self is. 
161 Identité transcendentale,  p.129. 
 74 
produit d’une pure liberté. Il s’agirait en somme d’une pure “opérationnalité sans sujet ni 
fin”, entièrement libérée du sujet lui-même et de toutes les déterminations impliquées 
dans sa propre constitution en tant que sujet réel, c’est-à-dire par son propre procès de 
reproduction dans le monde et dans la société162”. 
 
This essentially describes the archetype of what is at play within the virtualization of the “real 
world” and its yet more empirical manifestation within virtual reality proper. But it also invokes 
the radical promise of emancipation issuing from technological determinism; “a pure 
operationnality; a non-being without subject nor end”. It is the “subjective” pole towards the 
technological singularity, which for Ray Kurzweil (who might I add, has worked for Google 
since 2012) signals the point where an artificial super or “general” intelligence transcends 
biological limitations, enables the dramatic amplification of creativity, and muddles the 
distinction between “real reality and virtual reality”163. The possibility or impossibility of its 
outrageous empirical realization is less important than what it betrays about both the technical 
imaginary and the fact of its effective possibility with regards to the specificity of the symbolic. 
What is thus conceived as autophagia within a globalizing ideology of progress through the 
absolute technical emancipation of the individual can only rather be witnessed as loss and 
sacrifice within the human spirit; having thrown away bonds perceived as chains, only to have 
the flesh itself feel like shackles in the yearning to emancipate oneself completely from the 










                                               
162 Dialectique et Société, Vol. 1, p.367. 
163 Kurzweil, R. (2005) The Singularity is Near. When Humans Transcend Biology. London. Penguin Books. We 
can interpret this in yet another way as the unburdening (décharge) of human being’s necessary tie to biological 




 This “original promise” of emancipation from the world born with the invention of 
cyberspace, and echoed in culture and media through the cyberpunk aesthetics and science 
fictions narratives in literature and film in the last few decades, and now the democratization of 
an automated model of governance based on a vision of total information capture: all invoke the 
ideal of an absolute subjective existence delivered from the biological and social constraints 
qualifying symbolic existence - the final chapter in the unfolding of Gehlen’s technical 
liberation. Whether celebrating the impending arrival of humanity’s next evolutionary step or 
mourning its imminent loss, it is the sense of inevitability that consistently figures itself among 
these various representations of the relationship to technique and its unfolding. Alas it is this 
apparent inevitability that this work has moved against. Above demonstrating the obvious fact 
that the increasing complexity of our extrinsic technical developments are not occurring 
independently of human practices, one of this work’s main drivers has been to validate the notion 
that sociologically making sense of our current relation to technique necessarily involves an 
avowal of both the symbolic nature of  subjectivity and the epistemological influences that have 
animated our contemporary relation to technique in its historical specificity.  
 Consider how in Greek antiquity, ergazasthai denoted the practices involved in the care of 
nature (such as arboriculture or pastoral activities) and the order of its disclosure, in comparison 
to the laborious agricultural practices in ponos, and a more active and provocative relation, 
which manifested in artisanal practice (emanating from man rather than from nature) as poiesis. 
The wariness towards this provocation (hubris) was for example augured through the 
aforementioned structural dependency of the artisan to the collective and subjugation to the 
forms of his creations164. All three qualify modes of revealing (aletheia) as a generalization of 
                                               
164Recall that the autonomy of the artisan implied the mastery of a certain trade, the knowledge or “know-how” 
which remained outside the scope of collective social life. Both the practice and passing on of this know-how 
(technē) had a certain esoteric character reminiscent of magic, doubling over his status as exteriorized, and 
qualifying both the artisan’s identity as such and his or her relation to the collective from which arose the derived 
meaning of artisanal activity. In the context where technique itself has yet to arise into its own, poiesis was 
intrinsically tied to technē, not simply as art, as revealing, but in its being outside the general economy of the 
collective, outside the polis (rather within the economy of the household - idion). In effect, the latin of industry, 
endostruere, refers to production “from the inside”. See Freitag, M. (2008) L’impasse de la globalisation: Une 
histoire sociologique et philosophique du capitalisme. Montréal: ecosociété; p.68, 403. 
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the ontological relation between the “hidden” and the “manifest”, itself the spectre of the original 
symbolic differentiation between the “sacred” and the “profane”. By contrast, Hobbes’ “dictates 
of right reason” - his name for the “laws of nature” - are contrary to tradition centred around 
man. The idea that man is but the art of God should be understood in the context that God and 
the world are not equivalent165; God, the soul, and speech that has no basis in perceivable reality 
are of an immaterial status. On one hand, the world is immanent to the will of the divinities 
beyond, and the art of men in poiesis - due to its potential for immoderation (la démesure) - must 
be kept in line with the order of nature in its cultivation; in its belonging to it. On the other, while 
natural laws are necessarily manifestations of God’s dominion, the will of God is manifested and 
exercised through the art of man which encapsulates both his very ability and necessity for 
government.  
  Such is the manner in which the unity of human civilization outlined itself against nature 
within political modernity. Freitag’s description of the historical unfolding of technique 
demonstrates that it could not have manifested in its conceptual specificity before the act of 
production differentiated from its art (its expression). However, the normative and structural 
conditions of its ideological liberation were already latent from the moment the transcendental 
reference to a common world became contained within the individual (all the more when one 
considers the distinction of the  “product” as artifice), a most condensed example of these 
conditions being found within scientific epistemology. Through this discharging or forgetfulness 
(lethe) of being in its belonging-to, in the steady dwindling of the irreducible alterity with the 
world, with others, and with self, and the abating of representation fed by increasing 
technological ubiquity, it is the general symbolic consistency of human existence that is slowly 
being sublimated into the system, regardless of whether “the system” refers to the hyper-
rationalization of a general symbolic structure or its reification within a pervasive 
communications network increasingly grafted within social life. 
  Practically speaking, the first cyberneticists generally understood the inherent limits of 
universalizing information in its ontology, particularly within the context of mathematics. In 
                                               
165 Leviathan, XXXI. 15; “Secondly, that those philosophers, who said the world, or the soul of the world was God, 
spake unworthily of him; and denied his existence: for by God, is understood the cause of the world; and to say the 
world is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.” 
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Noble’s analysis, Wiener in particular was not caught up in reifying the biological similes for 
feedback control: 
 
“His approach, reflecting a lifelong interest in biology and a morality based upon 
independent acts of conscience, was organic, ecological, and human. He emphasized 
especially that living systems were open and contingent rather than closed and 
deterministic because the “steersman”, the self-correcting mechanism, was human in 
social systems and thus moved not by formal logic but by skill, experience, and purpose. 
Any technical parts of such systems, he stressed, should be designed to complement, to 
be compatible with, and therefore to sustain and enhance human life. […] Overly 
determined systems would suffer in several serious ways166.” 
 
 Recall that the problem the original cyberneticists faced was that of narrowing the context 
of information into the system without diminishing the nature of information's transmission, and 
this problem became practically insurmountable when questions of reflexivity (self-reference) 
within the system were involved. It was found that an organism’s homeostatic processes could in 
principle be rationalized and reproduced in machines to serve a very specific function, but that 
the issue of reflexivity involved a level of outside noise and complexification that even went 
beyond the level of representation comically elucidated in Borges’ fable of the cartographer 
drawing a map as large as the empire. Every iteration of the ‘reflexive-like’ feedback loop 
invariably creates a surplus of noise that cannot be accounted for by the system, eventually 
rendering the closed system critically unstable.  
 The presence of noise in the system carries the image of that which is beyond the system’s 
apprehension; that which cannot be reduced to a series of logic gates. In a way, the excess that 
inevitably marks reflexivity in the system effectively signifies the impossibility of encapsulating 
(or at the very least fully determining) the dialectical moment of synthesis where a subject 
realizes itself in its specificity within the objectivization of a world and thus indicating the 
capacity for judgement he or she enacts. In Freitag’s thought, this inability to encapsulate 
synthetic judgement speaks less to the failure of cybernetics and information technology, but 
                                               
166 Forces of production, p.71; “In striving to construct a practical philosophy of technology that would meet the 
challenges of the second half of the 20th century, Wiener asked his readers to stop and reflect deeply about the new 
technology: “just what part you wish it to play in your life and what relation to it you wish to have are the choices at 
issue””. In an ensuing footnote describing Wiener’s refusal to participate in military research, Noble further notes 
that “His professional colleagues, step-in in military research and development, continued to profess their 
admiration for Wiener, but dismissed his social writings as amateurish “philosophizing,” a careless overstepping of 
the bounds of his scientific expertise and, to some, a sure sign of his approaching senility”.  
 78 
rather evades the ontological nature of human practice and the manner in which being’s capacity 
for synthesis is expropriated to and dissolved in the machine’s mode of acting in the world 
(Gehlen again). It essentially usurps the normative ontological and epistemic conditions of 
possibility and renders them as pure operability within some probabilistic potentiality, as the 
quest for a positive knowledge of reality is replaced by the direct mastery of all that we can 
anticipate, control, or effect in our environment, so that the world is now seen and effected 
through our capacity to delegate action. 
 This aforementioned “excess” of the existential awareness of reality equally signals the 
fallibility constituting the defining boundaries of our capacities as receptive beings and goes 
hand in hand in its limiting capacity with the synthesis of the categories of action in producing 
meaning in the world. Bergson once hypothesized that the brain was reductive in nature rather 
than productive; that it served as a resistor to the information available to us in the world rather 
than an organ which accumulates information over time, so that the organism may find its way. 
The world is already in a sense contained within the individual. To narrow it into a series of 
discrete information flows to be disclosed in consciousness, so that it may then be usefully 
appropriated, is nothing more than a single mode of activity, that of technicity developed under 
an evolved mathematical logic (whose symbols are emancipated from worldly geometric forms) 
declaring its supremacy over other forms of knowing. There is a fundamental difference between 
the overcoming of limitations, and the self-destructive attempt at eradicating limitation as such. 
Even as a mere thought experiment, Bergson’s idea compels us to consider the ways in which the 
limits of our humanity, both physiological and thus symbolic, are so much more than boundaries 
that we must emancipate ourselves from. The world binds us, and as such provides us with an 
avenue for expression and growth. Affectively and existentially, boundaries in space and time 
substantiate our sense of purpose and our questioning of the world while granting us the 
conceptual tools to even begin making sense of the infinite; the fundamental ineffability of the 
cosmos is at the foundation of the transcendental ground of existential inquiry. Pure information 
as objective knowledge gives us exactly what we strive for; the technical requirements to master 
our material condition, at the cost of that which is has always been essentially and, as I argue, 
necessarily beyond our conscious understanding and thus our language as communication; the 
experience of the world itself. Relative to this viewpoint, technique is to be brought to its highest 
immodesty (hubris) at the cusp of information society, and while “the machine’s” glutinous 
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appetite for information is justified under the rhetoric of increasing the quality of life of all its 
participants, the subject’s antonymic engagement with the technology does not reproduce the 
conditions of possibility for these ideals, but merely the operations of the machine. As one of the 
many worldly references to the essence of human practice and humanity more generally, 
technology is here to stay; to rebuke it is to miss the point. What we must not allow ourselves to 
accomplish however, is its substitution on one hand for the very transcendental referents which 
defined human beings through the general capacity to develop it to such an extent in the first 
place, and on the other the conditions under which we may confuse evolution with self-
annihilation in the subtle but important diminishing of the inactual within representation. An 
activity cannot be more effective, efficient, and expressive in any meaningful sense if its cost is 
the loss of catharsis, the transcendent, and the sublime. 
 At the beginning of this work we inquired about the social and ideological dynamics at 
work with Stradivarius sound bank and the idea that the preservation of an objects essence can be 
“saved” through digital reproduction. It may very well be the apex of current technological 
capability, and one must entertain the possibility that it exceeds the technical capacity of human 
hearing, but it remains an act breaking down the sound of the instrument into its basic 
characteristics and preserving them as either samples or impulse responses. The technical 
capacity of the senses on its own cannot contain the sum of their coming together under a lived 
experience that is recognized symbolically. From the perspective of an activity contained in the 
object’s use, the technical prowess of the musician is only a factor insofar as he or she can let the 
instrument speak for itself. So they make it run through all the noises, sounds, dynamics, notes, 
and scales which are in themselves outside of any musical circumstance, beyond the limits of the 
contextual, and therefore arguably devoid of musicality. In other words, it expresses an idea of 
instrumentality (in this sense quite literal as instrumentation167) that is completely devoid of 
humanity. 
 On a higher level, we have seen how the rationalization of institutional regulation - not 
introduced, but rendered increasingly effective - through systemic automation collapses the 
necessary transcendental quality of action in preserving its specificity within their respective 
institutional contexts. To the extent that information (knowledge) is what assumes the form of a 
                                               
167 This perfectly exemplifies the necessary reference to action within instrumentality in that the latter cannot be 
wholly contained in the tool.  
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commensurable value, it becomes the ether of social and economic progress (when these 
dimensions are not simply conflated!), and the various domains of practices within society 
accommodate themselves to its production and continuity. 
 It is precisely this shift - both real and conceptual - in the quality of institutions, the nature 
of the roles they inhabit within society, and the place of the subject within them that evades the 
social science currents grounded in cybernetic conceptions of pure information that feed both 
notions of the social as manifested merely in relations between individuals and the view of 
society as a system. From this perspective, the social sciences are no longer in a position to 
critique the grounds of contemporary society since its general conception of the subject obscures 
the radical change both it and society undergoes within algorithmic governmentality and the 
technocratic management of social life more generally. Durkheim’s conjecture that sociology 
should have its own scientific object - that of society and the social phenomena it encompasses - 
should be interpreted through Freitag’s argument that, within the larger scientific aspiration of 
acquiring new knowledge, sociology was instituted on the aim of enlarging society’s knowledge 
of itself. Critique thus plays a primordial role in its conception. Yet, what it accomplishes today, 
in the context of the university organization that is essentially charged with the creation of value 
(knowledge) instead of valuing knowledge, is essentially in continuity with the efficient 
pragmatism of what the system does for itself.  
 
“Dans cette nouvelle condition sociétale, les “sciences sociales” sont portées à 
s’identifier directement à la fonction de gestion technocratique du social et de production 
de l’unité de la société, en même temps que le “technologisme” devient leurs discours 
d’autolégitimation immédiat, en ce sens qu’il s’identifie désormais aussi au discours de 
légitimation de la société. Toute distance entre la normativité épistémologique des 
sciences sociales et la normativité idéologique de la société tend alors à disparaître…” 
[emphasis my own]168.  
 
We have already seen that what is produced in algorithmic governmentality is a predictive model 
of subjective behaviours at one particular point in time. From the perspective of the system, the 
unity of the totality is reduced to its stability between states, the ‘negative time’ between one 
iteration of the model and the next. From the perspective of the subject, the social in its totality is 
reduced to the play of desires without origin; the meaning of action is directly contained within 
                                               
168 Freitag, M. (1998) La crise des sciences sociales; p.162. 
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its operability, and refers to nothing other than what it does within the system; the symbolic 
reference of any action becomes generalized instead of universal, arbitrary instead of localized. 
In other words, in the operationalization of total information, the unity of society is further 
dissolved into this operation of the system in equal fashion as the norm refers to its operation; it 
is as if the norm emerges directly from reality itself rather than from a symbolically mediated 
understanding of the world169. Hayek’s argument that only the free market can assure the rational 
form of knowledge, and that in a sense it is therefore the market in itself that constitutes a 
subject, is increasingly reified as the various processes of Big Data are integrated into the social 
structure; a structure merely relating to itself. As such, information as a cosmological principle, 
particularly within the context of governmentality and political representation more broadly, is 
not only ontologically impotent as a transcendental category, it is its antithesis.  
 Sociologically speaking, it is this precise dimension of our new technologies, and more 
generally their effects on the ways in which they ontologically reconfigure the nature of social 
reality for human beings, that must be considered in our reflections on contemporary issues. The 
aim of this work has been to demonstrate that fully capturing both the structural and 
phenomenological dimensions of this fact is possible through an avowed epistemological 
position starting from the symbolic subject of a dialectical identitary synthesis. The interjection 
of the properly technological is omnipresent. Whether we examine its objects (in their physical - 
gadgets, phones, computers - as well as virtual forms - the internet, new media) or the manner in 
which they reconfigure communication, social action, modes of identity development and 
socialization, sociology must recognize the increasing possibility of its succumbing to the very 
changes instigated by these phenomena, in the way it has when questioning its own value under 
the methodological crisis that an increasingly ubiquitous use of data analytics has brought about. 
Within the context of an information society obsessed with pragmatism and the urgency of action 
in the face of growing ecological, biological, economic, and existential concerns, there is an 
equal urgency for the reflexivity inherent to grand social theories, contemplation over the role of 
sociological discourse, and the privilege of its particular philosophy in its historical context. On 
the one hand, it has become impossible to do this without coming face to face with the gravity of 
information technologies. On the other, reflection on these matters must be necessarily a 
                                               
169 Algorithmic Governmentality, p.VII. 
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reflection on the nature of sociality, on its ontological status as symbolic, in our contemporary 
societies. Otherwise, our analysis is without foundation, disemboweled and assimilated within 
the direct and irreflexive operability of a system increasingly becoming an effective structural 
reality. Alas, it is a properly sociological object, and if its possibility is not reflected upon in this 
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